General Wesley Clark's Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee
July 12, 2007
transcript by Reg NYC and Melange

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): I want to welcome everyone to this first in a series of four hearings we're going to have this month, at this subcommittee level on alternative strategies for Iraq.

I was listening to NPR yesterday morning, and they had an interview with, with troops that were deploying overseas and what service in America means. And one woman was briefly interviewed, Staff Sergeant Nicole Walden, and she said, "I'm Staff Sergeant Nicole Walden. I dropped my kids off a week and a half ago, because my husband and I are both deploying. So, my kids had to go stay with their grandparents." And the interviewer says, "Tell me again their ages." And she says, "Three and one. I wake up in the morning and they're not there, and I just- It's unreal." And she goes on to say that she's not complaining, because she gets so much support. But you think of the tremendous sacrifice that this family, this mother and father making to leave off those two toddlers, young toddlers with, with grandparents.

Well, my own view is that we, in the Congress, owe those men and women everything we can do to have the right strategy in our foreign policy and our national security, but particularly with regard to Iraq. Mr Aiken and I have both been frustrated and have shared our frustrations to each other about the tone of the debate for this first six months of, of the year in terms of the polarization that's occurred in the, in the Congress, and we wanted to have a series of hearings in which we invite smart people, experienced people who can give us some other ideas and, and maybe other ideas are going to be that there's not as many other ideas out there as we would like. But we want to, we want to hear from other smart people about what other options are.

We hope to enhance the public debate and inform future full committee deliberations. We've invited retired senior military officers, defense policy experts and academics who specialize on the Middle East. The full committee under Mr. Skelton's leadership is holding complementary hearings on a broader scope. Yesterday it heard witnesses give their views on the global security assessment. Upcoming full committee hearings will address Middle East regional security issues, the interim Iraq report and General Petraeus' September report on the surge.

We've asked our witnesses, both today and the ones coming up the rest of the month to look forward rather than backward, without intent on rehashing over mistakes that were made or how we got to where we are. We've been asked, we've asked our witnesses to look ahead and explore options. I think from the written statements we received, we've got some witnessed today with different views, and so we hope that there will be a, a, a vigorous discussion amongst them too about what they think of each other's ideas.

Today's hearing will begin with testimony from retired General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of, of NATO. General Clark appeared before the full committee in both 2002 and 2005. He will be followed by Mr. Max Boot, who is Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. And our final witness will be Dr. Muqtedar Khan, who is the Director of Islamic Studies at the University of Delaware and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. And I, Gert would get mad at me if I didn't also acknowledge that Wes is my neighbor, and she walks past my house every morning on her morning walk. He lives down the street from me. Although I see you more here, Wes, then I do back home. So welcome to all of you and now we'll hear from Mr. Aiken.

Rep. Todd Aiken (R-MO): Let me begin by recognizing our new Chairman of the Subcommittee, Dr. Snyder. I look forward to working with you, Doctor, and I know that under your stewardship the Committee will continue to work on critical issues facing the Department of Defense in a bipartisan manner. And Vic, thank you so much for choosing to be our, our Chairman. That has been the, the tone of this committee, and it, I think it's very positive. I think it's something that the general American public would be pleased with, to see people who are trying to solve problems instead of involve ourselves too much in politics.

And today's hearing is the first of a series aimed at breaking out of that sort of a false concept of saying there's only two alternatives in Iraq - either the precipitous withdrawal or the stay the course. Somebody once told me that when somebody wants to put you on the horns of the dilemma, you don't want to choose either horn. That's a poor decision, and we want to know what are the different alternatives and want to try to quantify those. Given the current political environment, the President's interim progress report and benchmarks mandated by this Congress and the debate taking place in the floor of the House today, I know that this series of hearings could be challenging. But I agree with the Chairman that the Congress must carve out space we can focus and wrestle with politics, I mean with policy and not politics.

I hope these hearings provide this space for thoughtful, nonpartisan discussion. So, I agree this will be a useful exercise, but only if it's done in that format. The purpose of the hearing is to hear alternatives to the current strategy that truly offer a different plan. Simply critiquing the current approach is not the point of this hearing, and it, it, it may be helpful, but we need to say, 'What are the alternatives?' I ask the witnesses to offer and define an alternative plan and explain how it's different from the plan General Petraeus is currently implementing in Iraq.

Let me help begin this exercise by identifying key features of the current strategy. In 2006, U.S began shifting its strategy from having our Armed Forces pursue Al Qaeda and building the Iraqi Security Forces to a strategy that emphasized having U.S. combat forces go door to door performing counterinsurgency mission aimed at securing and holding Iraqi neighborhoods. Implementing this plan requires roughly 160,000 troops at a cost of about ten billion a month. Currently troop levels also allow the U.S. to train, equip and advise the Iraqi Security Forces and deter regional actors from destabilizing the democratically elected government of Iraq. There are signs that this plan is working, but according to General Petraeus, the strategy cannot be fully assessed until this September.

I offer this broad sketch of the current strategy to emphasize the strategic issues that any alternative plan must address. Any plan must, at the very least, do the following: First, state the roles and missions of the U.S. Forces in Iraq; second, state the personnel levels required to complete these missions; third, state the expected funding requirements to execute the plan; fourth, clarify the U.S. role if any in building the Iraqi Security Forces; and last, at the minimum explain how the plan deters regional actors from destabilizing Iraq. Responding that the current plan doesn't work or fails to adequately address these areas is simply not enough. Again, we're asking you for an alternative, not another critique.

I would ask my colleagues on the Subcommittee to be vigilant about truly challenging these proposals so we can be sure that what we're talking about is in fact alternatives. With these parameters in mind, I look forward to hearing our witnesses' statements. And again, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, to agree to work on the take the Committee, and looking forward to today's hearings.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Okay, thank you. I wanted to mention that we've been joined by Ms. Shea-Porter, who is actually not a member of the Subcommittee, but has been a outstanding member of the full Committee and, and wanted to attend today. And, and we'll give her an opportunity to ask questions too, after the other Subcommittee members if, if she would like to.

We, as you know, there's a very vigorous debate going on today on an Iraq resolution by Mr. Skelton. We don't anticipate any votes between, somewhere between 4:20 and 5 or some. So, I think we're going to have plenty of opportunity to get at least through one round of the questioning, if not more before, before those votes. So, General Clark, let's start with you, and we'll go to Mr. Boot and Dr. Khan. Now, we're going to put the five minute clock on just so you'll have a sense of where we're at, but if you see that red light go on and you need to say more, you say more.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and I've prepared a statement for the record. I'd like to have it included. I don't know what-

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Your statements will be made a part of the record.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: But I'm very proud to come before you and, and Representative Aiken and the other members of this committee, first to say thank you, because all of us who served in uniform are very grateful for the warm support of the House Armed Services Committee, what you do, and the seriousness you bring to the task.

Indeed it is appropriate that you try to get out of the partisan mode as you look through these things, and I want to just summarize a couple of things in my statement and then talk more about the issues that, that Representative Aiken has raised. I'm not going to talk about every province today. I, I don't think that's the point, but I do want to put this discussion in perspective, because I don't think it's appropriate. I think we've been off base in the United States for four years in focusing excessively on Iraq to the exclusion of other problems in the region. There is no solution in Iraq without addressing the other problems in the region.

The idea that somehow a solution can deter outside intervention is, is not going to happen. There is outside intervention. Everybody knows it, and we're dealing with it on a daily basis in Iraq. So, we have to take contact into account the region. We have very strong interests in this region. There's a hot competition economically. We're working to provide protection and security for the State of Israel. We're dealing with Iranian expansionism and extremism. And we're dealing with Al Qaeda - in addition to Iraq.

So these are four long-term enduring interests in the region, none of which is resolved in the on/off switch debate about troop levels in Iraq. So, and none of which can be addresses satisfactorily if we just pull the plug and leave Iraq. So, we can't use the Vietnam analogy appropriately in this region. The problem though isn't troop levels. It- that was the problem initially along with the mission. We always needed more troops in Iraq than what we had. The problem now is first and foremost the U.S. national strategy in the region.

And so, here's my alternative. I'd like to see a different U.S. national strategy first. Why? Because General Petraeus, before him General Casey, before him General Abizaid and every one of us who've had any military experience have said you cannot win this war with military power alone. Military is a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient to the solution. So, you have to frame the military activities properly.

The Problem is that when we went into Iraq, we began with the assumption that Iraq was the first of a series of dominoes, which could be knocked off or overturned or replaced. As many as seven states were in the running as the dominoes, starting with Iraq, then Syria, then Lebanon, then Libya, then Somalia, Sudan and Iran. The word was out in the region that Iraq was just the first, and so those states on the hit list had an incentive to cooperate early to make sure we didn't leave to the next domino. And immediately, they began to become involved and take action. We've been very careful publicly in trying to not overplay their role, and certainly there's an insurgency going on internally in Iraq. But the point is that there's always been an outside regional involvement.

And so, what I'd like to see the U.S. strategy include is a full diplomatic and political as well as military component. And to do that, we'd have to start with a different mindset in the region strategically. So, here's my alternative. I'd like to us, us to renounce our aim of regime change - just renounce it. We're not interested in changing regimes in the region. We're not interested in overturning governments. We've already got our hands full trying to deal with Iraq and Afghanistan. We don't need to try to simultaneously redo governments in three our four other countries. It's just not there in terms of what we can afford to do.

We need to engage in sustained diplomatic dialog with these states in the region, even if we disagree with their policies, even if as some say they're in a state of war against us. From their perspective, we're probably in a state of war against them, and that's not an issue. We can still talk, and we can still find common interests, and we should be talking to Syria and Iran. We should be listening to our friends in the region like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Emirates and Qatar.

And we've got to understand that the work with Israel and the Palestinian issue is part of this problem, because it has to deal with Iranian reach. We've got to find an alternative to the isolation of Hamas in Gaza, because we're going to end up with another destabilizing humanitarian catastrophe on our hands there that further aggravates the U.S. strategic position if we don't.

Then we have to link these regional efforts to political efforts on the ground to deal with people. Now, those are the principals, and that's the change that I believe we need.

In terms of how that interfaces with the troop strategy, well the troops strategy's great. I mean we're sitting on an insurgency right now, and the more troops you put out, the harder it is for insurgents to move and fight and organize and intimidate people. And so, sure, I'm happy to have the troops there, but I think we've overcommitted ourselves. So, what I'm recommending to the Committee is this: I think we need over a six month period to pull a couple of brigades out. So, we've got a possibility to have a strategic reserve in the United States.

There are no magic solutions. I'm creating more brigades, and the Army's having trouble recruiting now, and I think that Congress needs to demand of the administration a suitable strategy for the region, a realistic strategy. The idea that we can continue to, to bludgeon away in Iraq with the blood and sacrifice of our man and women in uniform while inviting the preoccupation of Iraq in an adverse way by Iran and Syria and other regional actors, it is counterproductive, it's not going to lead to the conclusions we're looking for, and, to be honest with you, we've got to raise this debate above the troop level to have the kind of impact on the outcome of the mission that the American people seek.

So, I'm delighted to be here, and I look forward to participating in the dialog, Mr. Chairman, but I hope this committee will do its duty in helping to raise the dialog above troop strength and into the fundamental aims and purposes of U.S. engagement in the region.

Thank you.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Thank you General Clark. Mr. Boot, I'm not entirely sure the red light's going to come on. We're seem to be having a little clock problems, but Max Boot, go ahead.

Max Boot: I'll try not to be longer than anyone.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify, and I'm glad that you're holding this hearing to look seriously at third way options and what we can do in the future in Iraq, and I will talk about that in a minute.

But first, let me just caution you against too precipitous a pull-out or drawdown of U.S. troops in the pursuit of a third way option. That runs a very real risk of disaster. Let me quote to you one prediction of what will happen from a rather surprising source. "Americans must be clear that Iraq and the region around it could be even bloodier and more chaotic after Americans leave. There could be reprisals against those who worked with American forces, further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make power grabs. Perhaps most important, the invasion has created a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate." Now that quote is not from some supporter of the surge. It's not from some administration apologist. That quote is from last Sunday's editorial in the New York Times called The Road Home, which advocates withdrawal, but the Times is an honest advocate of withdrawal, and I give them credit for that, because it's editorial board admits the terrible consequences that would follow if we were to pull U.S. troops out. The Times favors withdrawal all the same, because it doesn't think our forces are doing any good at the moment.

I can certainly see how they reached that conclusion reading their own reporting, but that was not my finding after spending a couple of weeks in Iraq in April, and it's not the view of many of our soldiers on the ground with whom I speak. If I could just read briefly a quote to you, an e-mail that I got a couple of days ago from a field grade officer, a friend of mine who is currently serving in Baghdad. He wrote to me, "Max, here's some positive results of this surge strategy to date. I'm sure you've got the negatives down pat from all the media reports. Deaths caused by sectarian violence here in Iraq are down 75% from January to June. VBIED car bombs and suicide attacks have been cut in half from March to June, VBIED at their lowest level since August 2006, casualties from VBIED cut in half from February to June. Attacks in Al Anbar cut by 80% since February, the Iraqi Security Forces killed in action at two to three times the level of coalition KIA. The Iraqis are fighting and dying for their country. Tribes are rejecting Al Qaeda in Al Anbar, Salahuddin, Ninawa, Diyala provinces. Al Qaeda in Iraq is on the defensive and slowly dying," he writes, "but we need time to finish the job for everybody to recover." He goes on to say, "The big negative, of course, is lack of political reconciliation at the national level, but this is a lagging indicator. Progress has been made at the local level, and I believe the national leaders will follow in due course once the trend is clear."

Now I agree with my necessarily anonymous friend in Baghdad, and I would urge Congress to stick with the surge as long as possible. On present trends, the surge can be maintained through at least March of 2008. Then we can take out one brigade combat team a month to get down to the pre-surge level of about 15 brigades or 140,000 troops by August of 2008. That in turn can be sustained through 2009, assuming that we maintain troops on their current 15 month tours, or we could possibly do shorter tours if we're willing to call up more brigade combat teams from the National Guard. Of course, we can downsize further if General Petraeus so recommends.

Now I think we all basically, all the serious participants in this debate, agree on what the eventual end state should be, that we should have a smaller American force focused on advising Special Operations designed to stand up the ISF and to disrupt Al Qaeda operations - that's the crux of the Iraq Study Group recommendations that are being championed by Rep. Skelton and Senators Levin and Reid, and I think the, even the administration would generally agree that that's the long term game plan, but there is disagreement over how fast to draw down troops and how many we need to leave behind.

The Center for a New American Security, a Democratic think tank here in town, has outlined a credible model for an advisor-centric approach along the lines of the ISG recommendations, but I think it's low-balling troop estimates. The Center for a New American Security says its recommendations will require 60,000 troops. Based on my conversations with military strategists, I think the true figure might be more along the lines of 80 to 100,000 troops or maybe even a little more once you factor in the need for force protection, logistics and other demands, to maintain our advisors and Special Forces in Iraq. That's the long term end state that I think we ought to try aiming for.

I think withdrawing all of our combat forces by April 2008 would be a very big mistake and would unleash very grave consequences. A lot of suggestions have been made to cushion the shock. For example, you hear calls for diplomatic offensives, for new UN envoys, for partitions of Iraq, for diplomatic moves that we can make including some that General Clark just outlined. Now, in theory I think these are all good ideas to pursue, but I don't think any of them have much chance of working in the short term if we're losing the battle on the ground. And I outlined the plusses and minuses of a lot of those options in my written testimony at much greater length.

I also don't think that concentrating solely on advisory and Special Forces missions right now, which would require a radically stripped-down force presence, could work in today's climate. That would be essentially repeating the mistake of 2005 and 2006. 'As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.' We know that didn't work. Just look at what happened in Baquba, where jihadists set up their own Islamic state while we were moving troops out. And that happened with the Special Operations Command stationed only a few miles away at Balad. If the, our Special Operatives couldn't prevent the emergence of an Islamic state under their noses, what luck would they have if they were stationed in the Kurdish region or in Kuwait many, many miles away?

Our conventional troops however have managed to clean out Al Qaeda strongholds in Baquba, just as they had previously done in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tal Afar and other cities. In the past, we didn't have enough troops to consolidate those gains. Now, we may finally have enough troops to do all phases of a classic counterinsurgency campaign, but that takes time. There is no good alternative, unfortunately, unless we're willing to accept the disastrous consequences described by the New York Times editorial. The longer you allow the surge to run, the greater the likelihood that the advisor-centric approach will work down the road.

Now, I realize patience is running out here in Washington and across the country, but keep in mind, we're not staying with the same old failed strategy right now, a strategy that I strongly criticized last year. We are trying a new approach that has not been tried before. The surge in Plan B. The surge is the third way, and it has just started. General Petraeus deserves a chance to succeed or fail with his carefully thought out plans without being second-guessed from thousands of miles away. If he succeeds, that will make possible the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces without risking the collapse of the government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. But if we draw down right now, I think that the consequences would be very negative, not only for Iraq and the region, but also for American national security interests.

Thank you.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Dr. Khan.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Dr. Snyder, I am deeply honored to be addressing this committee, and I want to thank you and Representative Aiken for not only holding this important hearing, but also for the diversity of opinion that you are soliciting. I would like to open with two general observations which I think while some of us are fully aware of it, are necessary to provide a context.

In the past four years we've been fighting three hot wars - one in Iraq, against Taliban in Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda globally. We've been fighting one cold war against Iran, and two proxy wars against Hezbullah and Hamas. And all of this in the Muslim world. The score card is not exactly comforting. We have enjoyed partial success against Taliban in five and a half years. We have failed and are failing catastrophically in Iraq. Al Qaeda is back to pre-9/11 strength. It'll be a long time before the U.S. will back to pre-9/11 strength. We, on the other hand, are far from it. Iran has consistently outmaneuvered us in the cold war, and our proxies did not exactly distinguish themselves against either Hezbullah or Hamas.

So, the question that we ask as we seek ultimate strategies is how do we factor the monumental incompetence of the current administration. Even if we have a good third alternative, will that good third alternative be effectively and efficiently implemented. This is another question I think the Congress should consider. It's not enough to have a good idea. Can you trust the current administration to execute that good idea effectively is another important question.

I think that we all know why we need to withdraw from Iraq, but I believe that if we were to withdraw immediately, it will not only lead to a humanitarian crisis of genocidal proportions, but a tiny or mini Al Qaeda state will emerge in the Anbar province. Al Qaeda will be much closer to Europe. They are planning to use European citizens as their actors, and I think that the war against the West that Al Qaeda is waging will be much, much more tougher.

I think the conditions in Iraq will go so bad that the very public today which is demanding that the U.S. troops come back, there will be pressure both at home and worldwide for the United States to return to Iraq to fix the mess that it created. The world will blame the United States for the mess in Iraq if we withdraw, because before we went to Iraq, Iraq was a tyranny, but it was stable. The population of Iraq was growing. After we brought democracy to Iraq, Iraq's population is diminishing. They're living in chaos. Nothing works there.

So, it is important for us to realize that we are in a predicament where we cannot stay in Iraq, and we cannot withdraw from Iraq. We need to find a third way, and that is we need to find a way to have troops in Iraq without having American troops there. We must remember that we have more than 250,000 troops there - 150 to 160,000 U.S. troops and nearly 100,000 more civilians who are unable, this nearly a quarter of a million force is unable to stabilize Iraq. How do we replace this?

And I think this is where we have to call in the chips. In the Arab and Muslim world, we have so-called allies - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. We've been spending billions of dollars over the past few decades supporting these regimes. This year alone we are paying Egypt 1.8 billion dollars in military and economic aid, 468 million dollars to Jordan in economic and security aid, 370 million dollars to Pakistan in military assistance, another 100 million dollars to Indonesia. We should demand that these allies of ours replace the soldiers that we will withdraw. They need to put troops on the ground. We need nearly 300 to 400 thousand troops to patrol Iraq, to, to squeeze the insurgency out.

If we were to withdraw, not only would the insurgency escalate into a civil war, but Al Qaeda will become a prominent player in that region. It is not in the interest of Iran or Egypt or Saudi Arabia to have a destabilizing force in the heart of the Middle East. Right now, while the countries in the Middle East are delighted that the U.S. is failing, are horrified at what is happening in Iraq. But the delight at U.S. failure trumps their horror at what is happening in Iraq. They believe that if the U.S. is successful in Iraq, then the U.S. will go after them. So, it is essential for most countries in the region that the U.S. fail.

And so, what it really means is there has to be not just a tactical change in Iraq, but a fundamental change in American security and foreign policy in the region. We have to say that we are not a global threat to the Muslim world. We want to work with the Muslim world to stabilize the Muslim world, and if the threat, perception of threat that Saudi Arabia, that Syria, that Iran, that Egypt perceive from this whole strategy of democracy promotion in the Middle East diminishes, then they will be more willing to address the horror in Iraq. And if you provide logistics, if you provide financial support, if you provide air cover, then I think we could compel these countries to put troops on the ground. They don't have a choice. Either they work with the U.S. now to stabilize Iraq or get involved in the regional conflict if the U.S. were to withdraw immediately.

On this issue, the it is important for us to rethink out strategies towards Iran and Syria. Iran is essential to the stability of Iraq now and after our withdrawal from Iraq. If we need a strong Iran to stabilize Iraq, bombing Iran or weakening Iran as we pull out of Iraq will essentially lead to chaos in the region. We will be creating a power vacuum. We have to determine who is going to fill the power vacuum. I think it is important for the Muslim world to stop just criticizing the U.S. and step up to the plate in dealing with the mess that exists in the Muslim world, and I think it is important for us to call upon our allies to help us. We have helped them for decades. We are in need, and it's time for our friends to step up.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Thank you all for your comments. We will begin the round of questioning. We're having some clock problems. The timer works. The lights don't work so well. So, when you hear a gavel come down, that'll be about your five minutes and give you a chance to, to wind up. Mr. Aiken and I are going to put ourselves on the five minute clock so that we won't ramble on, I guess is the bottom line. Want to give everybody a chance. So, go ahead and start the clock there. I, I've always, I guess, enjoyed a good bar fight, and so I would li-, my first question, I'd like to give each of you an opportunity to comment on anything that you heard from the other two. General Clark.

(laughter)

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I, I just, you know, I'm all in favor of great work by the military. Most of these guys have worked with me or for me, and we've all been to the same schools. And I admire our leadership over there, our military leadership, and both Petraeus and Odierno worked for me at, at times. I understand, I think what their motivations are and where they're headed, and of course they want more time, and of course other people in the chain of command below them see the progress.

It, it's inevitable that when you put more troops in, you sit on an insurgency. It's harder for them to move, harder for them to resupply, harder for them to organize, harder for them to intimidate. There's no question that you gain when you put troops on the ground. The question is what is resolved. The plan behind the surge was that the presence of the troops, the sitting on the insurgency would lead to a political outcome that ended the conflict and ended the motivation for the fighting, and that's what hasn't happened.

Now, is it a lagging indicator? My guess is it isn't. The motivation behind the surge, the surge was that people are fighting because they're afraid, and once you stop the killing, they won't be afraid. I don't think that's the sum of the motivations inside Iraq. Instead, it's a combination of an opportunity to grab power. It's personal ambition. It's regional incentivization with contacts with outside powers. And without a diplomatic strategy for the region, those motivations will not be addressed.

So, I don't think it's adequate simply to say, 'Let's defer any strategic discussion, support the surge, and then we'll see what happens.' This Congress needs to be heard that this administration needs a regional diplomatic strategy different than the current diplomatic strategy.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Boot.

Max Boot: Well, I certainly agree that we need a regional diplomatic strategy, and we can always use more effective diplomacy. But I think it would be a mistake to oversell what diplomacy can do when our troops are not seen as winning on the ground, when in fact the perception is that they are being defeated and are on their way home. That does not create great incentives for those countries in the region, those players in the region who don't like us to negotiate with us. When you look at things from the standpoint of Iran and Syria, why would they want to cut a deal with us right now? They've got us exactly where they want us. They are beating us slowly. Their proxies are expanding their spheres of control within Iraq. They have no reason to compromise.

The Iraq Study Group suggested they have a theoretical interest in the stability of Iraq. That may be the case or that may not be the case. But they have a greater interest in expanding their sphere of influence, which they are doing at the expense of the stability of Iraq, and they have an interest in keeping the United States tied down and fighting us by proxy. That's what they're doing very effectively, and unless they see that their strategy is not going to work, I don't see any reason why they should become any more accommodating with us.

There're also major concessions that will be required in order to win Syrian or Iranian cooperation that don't generally get mentioned by groups like the Iraq Study Group or others. For example, what about the Iranian nuclear program? Are we going to allow them to go nuclear? Is that going to be the price of some help that they might give us in Iraq? What about Syria? Are we going to allow them to dominate the democratic state of Lebanon? That's what they want. Are we going to allow that as the price of some Syrian help in the case of Iraq? Those are very, very hard compromises to make, and in fact the Iraq Study Group shied away from making those very compromises, because they know how unpalatable they would be to most Americans. But we need to think seriously about what is the price of cooperation.

Now, Dr. Khan also raised the issue of getting cooperation from some of our so, so-called moderate Muslim allies in the region. I'm all in favor of it! If we could convince the Egyptians, Saudis, Indonesians and somebody else to send hundreds of thousands of troops into Iraq to take up what our troops are currently doing, God bless them! I'm in favor of it! That would be a wonderful idea. However, I think the odds of that actually happening are basically a snowball's chance in hell. We tried to get those troops when we initially invaded, which would look like a much easier proposition than we are asking them to undertake right now.

There is no chance that those countries are going to willingly send their troops to face the kind of challenges that our would face, and even if they did send them, you have to think about the political repercussions of that. Would the majority Shi'ite population of Iraq welcome primarily Sunni troops coming from countries that have expressed their fear and abhorrence of Shi'ite control of, of Iraq, countries that basically want to help the Sunni minority? That's very unlikely. Would the Sunni minority in Iraq favor troops coming in from Shi'ite countries like Iran? That's very unlikely too.

So, I don't think that there is an easy way out of this where we say some other troops will come in or some kind of diplomatic offensive. We have to face the harsh reality, which is that we will have to win or lose this war on the ground, and no amount of diplomacy can make up for that hard military reality.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Let's get Dr. Khan to make any comments he wants to make, and then we'll go to Mr. Aiken.

Dr. Muqteder Khan: Well, since you've already called it a bar, I need to take the gloves off.

(laughter)

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): We call these vigorous discussions.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Let me put it very bluntly as to what U.S. presence in Iraq today is. What the jihadis and the insurgencies have accomplished in Iraq is amazing. They have contained the United States in Baghdad and in Anbar Province. These rag-tag bunch of fighters, they have held a superpower completely contained. They've boxed the United States in Iraq for four years. They're providing a public good for all the rogue regimes and all these regimes that we don't like by providing the U.S., by creating conditions where the U.S is unable to do anything to any of these regimes. The dreams of reforming Syria, the dreams of containing Iran, the needs of transforming Saudi Arabia and Egypt - all of these are now down the drain. The only thing that the U.S. now wants is to get out of Iraq with it's pride (inaudible), and now as people, and this is what these people have accomplished. An this strategy of continuing with the surge with the United States unilaterally, with the rest of the world hating us and unwilling to cooperate with us is, is a recipe for disaster for the region as well as for the U.S.

So, there has to be a fundamental change. Yes, we have to manage to keep stability in Iraq, but we have to recognize that our strategies, our stated goals have created more enemies in the region than allies. The reason why Egypt, the reason why all these countries did not want to cooperate with us in 2003 was because we were telling the rest of the world that you are next. Look at the peace study reports. Even countries like Nigeria and Indonesia, large number of the population thought that the were next after Iraq.

We created an environment of fear in the rest of the Arab world that we were going to come after all of them. That is why they didn't cooperate with us in 2003. Now, they're laughing at us because we are not even able to go after and democratize Anbar Province. So, we need to be able come up and say that these goals have changed and we are real - the- I would call for a bond of new America, a new America with a new strategy, with a new face and new people who will work with us. Nobody wants a nuclear Iran in the region. Nobody wants Al Qaeda dominant in the world.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Aiken for five minutes.

Rep. Todd Akin (R-MO): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thought your, your question was great. I guess the thing we were hoping to do was to say, 'Are there other alternatives?' And it seemed like Dr. Kahn, you got pretty close to it by saying we're just going to replace the troops with troops from these other countries. I, I have to cheer Mr. Boot. Now, you probably have a lot more knowledge of the area than I do, but I'm a little skeptical whether or not all these countries are going to send troops in to replace ours, or whether they could be as effective as ours. But it's at least an alternative. I think it's good, and we're here first of all to define some distinctly different things.

None of you talked about a three-nation Iraq. Is that even an alternative, or is that something that's not an alternative? I thought of a completely wacky idea, but I think this is a place where we throw out some ideas and talk about them and see. Now, what I've been encouraging this committee to do what if, if it were up to me and - I, I'm not in charge - but if it were up to me, I would have a list of different possibilities. And then I would test those in terms of what's a proposed success, what's our goal and what's it going to cost us and, and all of that. So, we basically weigh a series of alternatives. We don't have to pick one here. That's not the job of this committee, but it would be helpful if we had some of them to find.

Is a three-nation Iraq even a possibility or not? Here's the wacky idea: What happens if you change the capitol of Iraq? Baghdad's a big pain in the rear. Why don't you move the government to some other place, and then let Baghdad just, if they want to just fight among themselves, at least it's not the center of government? You can at least let government functions go on without terrorism of, of Baghdad falling into it. I don't know. Maybe that doesn't make sense, but we need some innovative kinds of solutions.

And so, and, and, and Dr. Clark, I mean General Clark, you know, your, your proposal, in terms of standing back from the forrest, getting a little further back and defining our overall strategy. That's fine. It still doesn't really answer a whole lot. I mean, you're saying we're still going to have to take on the chin that we got to beat the insurgents on the ground, and no matter- even if we have a little different strategy, we still have to fight on the ground. I think I'm hearing. Mr. Boot, you're saying the same thing, that there's really no getting away from that. You just have to beat these guys on the ground, and if you have enough troops and given some time, we'll succeed in that. And I think Dr. Khan, you're saying yeah, I don't think you're going to ever do that. You got to get the other nations in the region more involved so they have some buy in. And that's not different. So, I just wanted you to respond to that. Give me some alternatives and some differences.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: First of all, let me respond in reverse order if I could.

It's- yes you must succeed in creating an impression of progress on the ground. That's important for a whole host of reasons, but I disagree that you have to hold up on the dialog and diplomacy with Iran and Syria until you have completed the surge. The truth is we have the greatest leverage that we could possibly have. We're the United States of America. We're the most powerful country in the world. We're the most legitimate country in the world. We dominate every global institution.

What Iran wants, even more than a nuclear weapon, is the blessing of the United States of America and the West and the world system of their civilization and their economic opportunities and political opportunities in the future. I know the statements of Ahmadinejad, but Ahmadinejad is not the only guy in Iran. We've got plenty of negotiating leverage, but I continue to hear from some people associated with the administration that there's not enough leverage. If they could just get more leverage on Iran, they'd be happy to talk to them. I think it's the wrong approach.

And that's, I, I know I'm taking up this time to explain this, but it's an odd thing that you've got a retired General who's an advocate of diplomacy and I'm sitting next to a representative from the Council on Foreign Relation which is a specialist in diplomacy, who's an expert on combat. What I'm trying to suggest is that it, if you're going to use diplomacy, use it now while there's some hope of progress on the ground, while you can save a few more lives and prevent a few, a little more heartbreak. But you cannot do it, as Dr. Khan says, unless you sincerely change the U.S. strategy.

From Iran's perspective, they think we're at war with them and determined to destroy their regime. They don't think we can do it. Ahmadinejad would like us to try, because we strengthen him when we do that. What we need to do is undercut him the same way we undercut these East European communists in the 1970s and 80s through a host of other political measures. If you do that, the strength of the resistance on the ground will slacken. The diplomacy will enhance our ability to cope with the insurgency and with Al Qaeda. It's mutually reinforcing.

I think the idea of splitting Iraq into three nations, it's a gimmick, and I cannot support it in good conscience. I've seen what partition does in the Balkans. Yes, we divided Bosnia, but it was already divided, and the pain of that ethnic cleansing was enormous. And for us to propose it in Iraq, I know it's happening, but for us to be the sponsor of it and the author of it and to own the consequences and to have Iraqis 30 years and 60 years from now saying, 'Mr. Bush gave away me home in Baghdad.' It's- Why take that on ourselves. It's not going to bring a solution to the violence. It's just a recipe for another American, blaming America thing.

As far as the moving of the capitol is concerned, it's, it's a, it's another effort- I don't think there's any shortcut answers on this. We have a mistaken strategy in the region. It's cost us the problem in Iraq, and until we go to the heart of that strategy. All the political gimmicks we try and all the military tactics we enhance are only marginal to a solution.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): You want to hear from Mr. Boot and Dr. Khan?

Max Boot: Well, I'd be, I'd be happy to weigh in in support with complete agreement with, with General Clark that I don't think that partition offers the way out of Iraq. It's impractical for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the population is so intermixed, especially in major metropolises like Baghdad and Mosul, and whether Baghdad is the capitol or not, the population would still be there, and you have to figure out what to do with them. If you tried to separate it, the result, as General Clark said, would be mass suffering on a, on a terrible scale.

The only way it'd really work, I think, is if it were implemented it the way it was in Bosnia, where you had an accord among all the different sides, which was then enforce by a heavy outside troops presence, which in the case of Iraq would probably mean 4 to 500,000 troops. But that's a recipe for keeping more American and foreign troops in Iraq, not getting them out. So, I don't think that would really accomplish the objective that we're trying to achieve with partition in any case. I think it's a, it's not a realistic solution right now, because most Iraqis themselves oppose partition. We don't have a situation as we had in Bosnia where all the parties were exhausted by the conflict and therefore willing to come to the table and agree on partition. That's not the case in Iraq today. So, I don't think that would- offers a very workable solution.

But let me, since, since you do want a full and frank exchange of views here, let me- while I'm agreeing with my- with, with General Clark on one area, let me disagree with him on another, which is that while I completely agree on the general importance of diplomacy, I don't know that it really offers a way out of this. And what he's bas- what General Clark is basically suggesting is that, and what Dr. Khan is also suggesting, is that we renounce goals of regime change, and we basically say that we're happy with the status quo in the Middle East, that we work with the existing regimes and therefore this in turn will lead them to work with us. I'm not sure it'll be that easy.

Keep in mind that this was the strategy we were in fact more or less pursuing prior to 9/11, and there's a reason why we changed strategy after 9/11. Because what we had seen prior to 9/11 was that we were in bed with the dysfunctional status quo in the Middle East, that we were backing these despotic regimes that were hated by their own people. And as a result of that, many of their own people hated the United States. Now today, while it's true that we are at odds with the regime in Tehran, but keep in mind that by all evidence, the United States is very popular with the people of Iran precisely because we are at odds with the regime in Tehran, because they know that we stand for liberty and against the oppression which they hate, which emanates from their own regime.

Even if we wanted to, I'm not even sure we could cut a deal on any acceptable terms with the regime in Tehran. Those who say that we ought to reach out to them think that they want to reach out to us. That's not the evidence that we see. When we- when our ambassador and the Iranian ambassador held talks in Baghdad on May 28th, what did the Iranian regime do? At that very same time, it was grabbing four Iranian-Americans and jailing them on trumped-up charges of espionage, which was basically a giant 'up yours' to the United States. And that's what they think of diplomacy. That's what they think of political negotiations. They're going to take these hostages.

And certainly the statements that you hear from President Ahmadinejad are not those that would be conducive to a, a real dialog. In fact, there's a good- I'm not an expert on Iran, but a lot of Iranian experts will tell you that the Iranian regime basically depends upon keeping the Great Satan as as his bogeyman. They don't want to establish relations, because that'll undermine the rationale for their dictatorship. So, I don't think that the short term prospects of reaching a deal with Iran are very good.

In any case, I go back to a point where I think General Clark and I agree that if you are to have any chance whatsoever of reaching any kind of deal, you have to improve the status quo on the ground in Iraq. You have to stabilized the situation and negotiate from a position of strength, not of weakness.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Dr. Khan, I will give you a chance to respond, but I think we're going need to pay a little more attention to our time. We got seven more, seven more members that all have, will have questions. So, Dr. Khan.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: I don't disagree with anything that General Clark had to say. On the three nation Iraq (inaudible) just point out that the struggle in Iraq is not about territory. So, a territorial separation will not solve the problem. The struggle (inaudible) is for power and for resources. And so, for the first time in 500 years, the Shias have an opportunity to dominate Baghdad. The Ottomans kept them away for 500 years. For the, for the Muslim world, this is not a small thing. This is a major shift in power with the psychological implications for the Arabs as well for Muslims in general. So, it's not a territorial issue that can be resolved through territorial separation. That is the first thing to keep in mind.

Secondly, we do not want to become the new Great Britain, the inheritor of the global and imperial legacy of Britain. That's important for us to keep in mind. And even though I'm from Senator Biden's state, I disagree on this issue very strongly.

As far as the relocating of capitol, where would you relocate it to? Basra? It will further underscore the idea that we're trying to hand over the whole of Iraq to the Shi'ites. So, so the seeker of alternative capitol would quickly realize this is not a really very good idea. As far insurgency is concerned, we must realize that we, we do not think very clearly about insurgency. There are three or four kinds of things that are going on there: one, those who oppose U.S. occupation; two, those who oppose Shia domination; and then those who are against the West in general, that would be Al Qaeda. And we have to separate all the three dimensions of that insurgency and how we deal it. If we withdraw, then the insurgents who are opposed to this occupation will diminish, but there will be an escalation in those who oppose Shia domination. So, we need a political solution so that the Sunnis realize that they're not going to live in a Shia dominated Iraq, Iraq after we withdraw. And that would eliminate all forms of insurgency. And that will only leave Al Qaeda, and that we have to deal with, and we will have a major ally in Iraq.

And now, I just want to make this point that Iran is not out to get us. Iran wants to bait us. So, it's really very important for us to remember Iran wants us as a friend, as an ally. They want to go out with us. They want to be seen with us in the UN, et cetera, et cetera. And the reason why Ahmadninejad said all those things is very simple: we have made more concessions to Ahmadinejad then we ever made to the moderate Khatami, who said great things which are pro-democracy. So apparently, playing the bad boy seems to getting more rewards for Iran than being the good guy. And of course, that is also partly moderated by our, the newest position as a result of what's happening in Iraq.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): We will now go to Ms. Sanchez for five minutes, and hopefully we'll be rededicating ourselves to the five minute rule. Ms Sanchez.

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): I love how you call up five minute rule after you've done.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): I know it. Mr. Aiken and I, we're done. So, go ahead.

(laughter)

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): Anyway gentlemen, thank you for being before us, and I, I want to thank the new Chairman of this Committee. I've had the pleasure of serving with you on personnel as my Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I think you do a great job. So, I'm real excited to, to have you head this. And welcome to all of you, especially General Clark. Good to see you before again us today.

Oh Gosh. You know, I, I, think our troops are doing what they're being asked to do. I think they're doing a great job for what they have to do. I think from a military standpoint, this really isn't about the military anymore, and unfortunately, Mr. Boot, when you said they are bleeding us slowly, I mean, that's what they're doing to us militarily out there. So, I really come back to, you know, what do we do about the economy out there, and what do, what do we do with this government, and what kind of government do we have there. I mean, how, what do, what, what do we need to see from these people?

And I go back to, in March, I led a delegation over to Iraq, and Ms. Shea-Porter was with me, and because we were all women, we sat down with some of the Parliamentarians of Iraq who are women. It was very interesting to be in that room, because these three women - one a Christian, one a Shia, one a Sunni. It was like they had stolen each other's boyfriends. You know, they weren't looking at each other. They weren't talking to each other. We certainly couldn't get anything done in a 435 member body if we couldn't stand each other in the same room. I mean, we still have to move forward.

And it was very interesting, because if you listen to each of them, each had a different interpretation of what was going on in their country. The Shia woman thought everything was wonderful. You know, and she- of course! Because that's really who's controlling that government, and before when we were under Saddam, you know, her people were at the receiving end of something not very nice. So for her, the world was wonderful, and 'Wasn't it wonderful,' and we were all women, and 'It's all wonderful,' and 'Ms. Pelosi got elected,' and you know, the list went on.

And then we talked to, right, the Shia woman- the Sunni woman from Anbar Province, and she said, "My people are starving. You want to do something for us? Feed us. You took the troops out. We can't get convoys through. My children are starving out there. Everybody's starving. Do something. You want to help us? Get food to us."

You know, and then the Christian was like, 'Well, I think we can all get along, you know. We're going to work this out.' And they're not going to work this out!

So, my question to you, each of you, whoever - we'll be starting with the General and going down the list. What do we do about a government that doesn't want to talk about dividing the oil up, which is their main asset? What do we do about a government that doesn't talk to each other? What do we do about a government that, you know, that is, doesn't want to redo the constitution? We talk to NGO women who said, "You gave us a worse constitution than we had under Saddam. We have no rights, have the same rights (inaudible), the same rights as a child or a mentally disabled person. Now, thank you very much."

So I want to ask you, what do we do? I mean, we, what do we do about the political situation, because that really is, for me, what the third way needs to be if we're going to stay out there? General.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, let me begin by saying first, it's not our country. We don't own it. We cannot rewrite the constitution. We cannot tell them what they should and should not believe and how they should behave toward each other. What we can do is try to muster together all of the different ways of reaching the political leaders and the factions they represent with incentives to try to change the outcome, and that's why we must combine the military, the diplomatic and more intensive political work in the provinces in Iraq.

I cannot understand why this administration and people who seem to support it refuse to engage in diplomacy in the region. I, I don't understand it. They'd rather see people die than initiate a dialog, and I don't understand that. If we would do that, I think there's a chance we could reduce the levels of tension, and then maybe some of these other changes could work their way out. But our political options are limited, because we designed it in such a way that we leave the country back to its occupants.

Max Boot: Well, I don't think that the political solution to Iraq lies outside of Iraq. The key is how do you get the different factions to come to some kind of agreement. We've been trying very hard to do that over the course of the last four years. Our ambassadors Zal Khalilzad, John Negroponte, now Ryan Crocker, they've all had these meetings in Baghdad with representatives of the various factions trying to work out an agreement. And they haven't had a lot of luck, because even when they have worked out agreements, they haven't meant very much on the ground, because there has been a pervasive climate of insecurity and fear in which no faction feels able to make compromises or concessions to the other one, because they're afraid they're going to get killed if they do that, and their people are being killed in the streets.

Now, the theory behind the surge, the theory behind the current plan is if we can create some stability, if we can decrease the climate of fear, this will allow those Iraqis who are more moderate - and they do exist, people like Ayatollah Sistani, the former Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, as many consider-

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): Mr.-

Max Boot: -has been-

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): I, I understand the surge prospect. You know, I don't need to be schooled on that. Maybe I can hear from Mr. Kahn unless you have something new to add.

Max Boot: Well, the only think I would add is I don't, I don't, I don't-

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): I don't think the surge is working.

Max Boot: Well, I think there are indicators that it is. There's some indicators that it are negative. It goes both ways, but let me just, one point I'll make in conclusion is I don't think the political problems are insoluble. That's the same thing that people said about Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 'These people just hate each other. They want to kill each other.' Well, we saw that with far-sighted American policy implemented by General Clark, with troops on the ground providing security, we were able to solve those problems. And I think we are able to do the same thing in Iraq if we would just focus on security first.

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): Mr. Khan.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: I, I have a question for you. After that woman told you that her people were starving, what did you do? Did you step out of the room and immediately call for an aid drop of food in her constituency?

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): No, certainly not.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Why not?

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): Because I, I'm not in the Executive Branch.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: See, this is-

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): I don't control the troops. That's what the President controls.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: See, this is exactly thing here. If we were doing things like that, then the message would go that we really care about the people to whom we decided to bring democracy and stability. If we really cared about their suffering under Saddam Hussein, we would surely care about their suffering when they're starving, a initiative such as that would have done a lot more for winning hearts and minds, and believe you me it would have cost us far less than a single cruise missile.

This is really an important issue. The President promised three, three steps when he talked about the surge. He talked about fighting the insurgency, renewing development, and a political solution. And on the other two things we have hardly achieved anything. It is, it is like this: He spent 600 billion dollars on defense and we spend 100 million dollars on public diplomacy carrying his budget, and all of it was redirected towards Katrina. He has absolutely no money to do nothing. The rest of the world knows this.

And he also tells us that very clearly that we actually do not have any intentions to have a sincere dialog with these people. You know that best argument about not attacking Iran is? The best argument for not attacking Iran is the bombing will not work, and the message that it sends is that our first choice is bombing. If bombing works, why do we talk? But since bombing cannot work, let's try diplomacy.

This is the message which really resonates very strongly in the Middle East, and it's important for us to sort of get beyond that. We have to convey the message that America is America. It is the city on the hill. We care about people regardless of who they are.

Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Khan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): I want to recognize Mr. Johnson for five minutes but first acknowledge that he is Mr. Skelton's appointee to this committee following the resignation of Marty Meehan. We welcome you and you're recognized for five minutes.

Rep. Hank Johnson: Thank you Mr., Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I'm honored to, to serve on this committee and under your leadership, sir. And I, I would say that I think it's important for us to, to understand how we got to this point. It was indeed a, a lack of diplomacy that got us in this hot water that we're in, and on the flip side of it, it was actually aggressive behavior by our Executive Branch. It was- and the motivation for that aggression, what was it?

Was it- some believe it was to capture and control the significant untapped oil resource, oil resources that exist in the reserves in Al Anbar Province. About 35 billion barrels of oil are waiting exploitation. Some believe that was the real reason that we went into Iran and invaded that sovereign nation against the advice of many of our military leaders, who told us that if we were to do it we would have to have much more boots on the ground, many more boots on the ground than we had the resources to supply over there, but we went in anyway.

And, and so, the result was predictable, and it has been a colossal boondoggle. And it's a tragedy that has resulted in over, you know, close to 3600 deaths, 500 billion dollars in resources. We're on the, on the hook for a couple of trillion dollars to, to recover from this. Our military assets have been so degraded that we now don't have the ability to face any other acts of aggression that may require our ground forces.

And so, what do we do from here? Do we, recognizing what got us here was the lack of diplomacy and, and aggressive behavior, now we need to, to engage in diplomacy to help us get out of this. I don't see where if we continue this, the so-called military surge that it's going to result in, in a better outcome than what has occurred up to this point. In fact, it'll just get worse.

And so, I like the idea of diplomacy, gathering the stake holders in that region together to talk about the challenges that exist. And I also like the idea of, of encouraging - with this new philosophy, the lack of aggressive pursuit of oil or whatever the, the case might have been - I like the idea of us having a new attitude when we approach our partners in the area, to encourage them to get involved. And certainly there's going to be a need for a force in Iraq to maintain the peace. The Iraqis are not able to do it themselves, and so therefore some kind of contingent that is made up of forces from other nations seems to be a great idea. And I would rather us help to fund that kind of operation then to just simply step away from Iraq and, and let it fall into a, into a just a cesspool of terrorist development.

So, I like the ideas that I have heard from both Dr. Khan and also General Clark. I think those can be melded together. And I would like to see us have a, a Executive Branch that will work with Congress to help fashion a new strategy for dealing with, with Iraq. And it also plays into the, the way that we deal with Iran and other nations in that area. Do we send a message to them that we're coming after you next? We're certainly not in a position to do so militarily, General Clark.

So, I would like to ask Mr. Boot to step out now from, from your, your defense of the surge and just ask you to think, just theoretically now, what- how could diplomacy bring about a different set of conditions in, in Iraq. I mean, is it, it is possible, do you think it's possible that diplomacy could, could make a difference there if we would draw down some of our forces, send a diplomatic message that we've changed our outlook on things and we now want to, to bring partners in to help us solve this situation? Is that something that can work?

Max Boot: Rep., I would love it if diplomacy would work, and I would love it if we didn't have any more fine young men and women risking their lives in Iraq. Believe me, nothing would make me happier. I just don't see any way that we can get our troops out of the line of fire and still achieve our basic national objectives such as keeping Al Qaeda on the run, preventing them from taking over provinces of Iraq, preventing a civil war that will spill over into the neighboring region and destabilize friendly states.

I think all three of us basically agree that if we just pull out now, the results will be catastrophic. What I disagree with is I don't think that diplomacy offers some kind of magic way that we can somehow draw down our forces and still achieve our objectives. I just don't think that there is that magical solution. I wish there were.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): We'll now go to - time's expired - but we now to go to those member who arrived after the gavel. We'll go in the following order in which people arrived: Susan Davis, Geoff Davis, Mr. Gingrey, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Miller and Mr. Jones. Ms. Davis for five minutes and then to Ms. Shea-Porter if, if, without objection from the Committee members

Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome you as Chairman of this Committee as well. Thank you all for being here and, and actually we don't always get a chance to mix things up a lot. So, we appreciate the fact that you're disagreeing, that we can hear where the nuances of that as well. It's important.

I just came back from Iraq as well, very quick snapshot, but there are a few things that certainly were clear to me. One was that, yes, I agree, we need more time, but the reality is that nobody could put a finger on what that is and certainly short of five to ten years in terms of development of leadership, probably not would get, probably wouldn't get the job done. The other thing that I think was apparent to me is: the threat is real. I don't think we can, you know, sugarcoat that in any way, but then the reality is: What greater threat are we not addressing because we're so focused on Iraq? And I, you could also talk about that, that would be helpful.

But my question really is around the reality that no matter what we do, I think, short of quashing our adversaries in, in every way possible that it would, would be seen as a victory by them. So, the question is, if, if that's the case, if you agree with that - and perhaps you don't - how do we then manage that without accelerating or further creating even greater problems down the line? And I'm not talking about, you know, just a good PR campaign, I mean in reality, how do we manage that message? Because my, my guess is no matter what happens it's going to be a little like Russia in Afghanistan. I mean, that's going to be a message.

If you agree or disagree, how do you manage? Whoever wants to go first. Dr. Khan?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: See, I, I find the question very intriguing. You're basically asking what are the larger implications of Iraq, and I think it's not just about Iraq or U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It's about the U.S.- the standing of the U.S. as a dominant and a moral leader in the world as well as a major player economically.

What has clearly been happening in the last five, six years is that we are bleeding economically. We are also bleeding literally. What Iraq has succeeded in doing is exposing the limits of U.S. power. The single most important lesson that we can draw from Iraq is that the United States is no more capable of achieving political goals through military means. Look at what has happened. Israel's failure in Lebanon is another lesson, that Israel cannot achieve political goals through military means. Abbas' proxy fight with Hamas in Gaza, Mahmoud Abbas lost, another lesson that we are not achieving political goals through military means.

So, without the fact that we're living in a period when the U.S. is unquestionably the most dominant military power, our ability to achieve political goals through military means has completely diminished. This is the most important lesson for us to learn.

And while we are bleeding in Iraq, China and India are growing and growing and growing. The challenges to U.S. domination are not coming from the Middle East. It's coming from Asia. Europe is becoming economically very forward. The Pound today is 2.25 or 2.3, 2.3. So, we have to recognize that are we going to lose the larger picture by pursuing these goals of regime change and transformation in Iraq, partly motivated by a vendetta post-9/11. These are some very serious questions about which we need to have debate.

And on diplomacy, we must understand that we think of diplomacy as something that the State Department does or Karen Hughes is supposed to do. No. Diplomacy is a way of doing business. So, Karen Hughes can go to Egypt and say one thing and then Rumsfeld or somebody else says something completely undiplomatic simultaneously and let's hope that diplomacy has to work. We have to understand that diplomacy is the way of doing business. The President is not just the Commander-in-Chief, but he is also the Diplomat-in-Chief. It's time he recognized that.

Max Boot: Well, unfortunately, I don't think that a pulling out of Iraq too soon will- there's any way that will help us to achieve other vital objectives around the world. In fact, I think it would imperil-

Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA): Can you just define for me "too soon"?

Max Boot: Yeah I'll come to that in a second. Because I think if we pull out of the situation given what is is today, that would be seen as a victory for Al Qaeda and Iran. I think that would be a blow to American interests around the world, and it would cause our enemies to redouble their efforts to hurt us elsewhere, for example in Afghanistan, where a lot of people say if we get out of Iraq, we can focus in Afghanistan. Well, I, I think if we get out of Iraq right now, the situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate even further, because Al Qaeda will pour more resources, resources into there, and they will feel more empowered to come after us the way they felt empowered after the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Now, how do we avert that? I think we have to realize that at this point there is no responsible alternative to a long term American presence in Iraq - five, ten years, something like that - the way we've had a long term presence in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, South Korea and elsewhere. Now, obviously it's untenable to have American troops fighting at this level of intensity and suffering these losses for five to ten years, but the hope is and the plan is that if the surge can try to stabilize the situation somewhat over the next year or so, and as Iraqi security Forces increase in effectiveness, they can take on more of the burden, and our forces can downsize.

And I think we all agree that eventually we want to have a smaller force, and I think something along the lines of the report issued by The Center for a New American Security, where we'd have a force basically focusing on advisory, on, on Special Forces missions and so forth. I think it would take more troops than they think it would take. As I said before, I think it would probably take around 80 thousand, but I think that's- we're probably going to need to have 80 thousand there for five to ten years to safeguard our interests.

Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA): Thank you. General Clark, did you want to-

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Go ahead General Clark.

Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA): My time's up but I'm trying to get in a quick response.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Yeah, we can go-

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I do think that when we pull out, we do have to manage the perception of that drawdown of force. I think there is a risk in it as your question implies. that's why I believe that you have to change the strategy before you work the drawdown, and that change in strategy has to involve the principles of renouncing forceable regime change.

I agree with what Dr. Khan is saying about the, the movements to take advantage of our engagement in Iraq by China and India and other powers. We're inflaming the Islamic world. We're feeding the Al Qaeda recruiting machine. Change the strategy first before we worry about changing the troops strength in the ground. We're debating the wrong issue in the American press, and the reason we've been debating that issue is because this way, if you disagree, you can be said not to be supporting the troops. It's convenient shorthand. Everybody understands troops. Strategy's too complicated. Diplomacy's too abstract. And so forth.

There's no magic bullet in diplomacy, but if we don't change the strategy and start talking to the nations in the region and change our aims in the region, then I don't think there's much chance of the surge, whatever its military success where the troops are at the moment, translating that into political success is unlikely.

Rep. Susan Davis (D-CA): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Davis for five minutes.

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Dr. Khan's comments very much and his perspective, and frankly, would like to meet separately with you where we can have a more free-ranging discussion on this from my own experiences in the Middle East in the military and otherwise. But one thing that, you know, I think that's been interesting in the dialog, both in the panel and also with some of the members, is I, I think we're falling into a false dilemma here very quickly, and that's that it's diplomacy or military force. You know, and, and particularly with General Clark's perspective.

Bosnia's diplomacy was effective because we had overwhelming military force on the ground and the ability to enforce our will albeit somewhat ineffectively and ham-handedly in areas. Human beings make mistakes, but it was necessary to preserve continuity and, and peace in that part of the world. It was a critical time that much of the world wasn't aware. And one of the reasons that the inefficiencies, the ineffectiveness of the interagency community, the nonuniform functions weren't there, I'm convinced, is because there were no casualties.

As we see on the evening news, and the General's agreeing with me, these casualties are provoking negative public opinion, a variety of factors. I think one comment I've heard that's been disappointing is "this administration" I think I've heard eight or nine times, but there's more to it than that. And this is really where I'd like to go with the, with this discussion. In Haiti, where many of our mutual friends had served, we encountered the same problems as in Iraq. The military could do its function, but the nonuniform peace didn't. That was under a Democratic administration with a Democratic Congress I might add, a very liberal Democratic Congress. And we had the same problem, but again the process is critical here for us to understand.

In Iraq, what we're seeing exacerbated in a huge way, separating out the diplomatic peace, is a broken national security process desperately in need of reform. The term 'strategy' has been thrown out, but I haven't heard anybody say what that end state strategy should be. And I think that the, you know, in my mind, we, we need serious reforms of the interagency process around a national strategy to integrate our instruments of power rather than deal with the silo of diplomacy or the silo of military force to work with the, the spectrum that would advance our cause and ultimately to your point as you rightly pointed out, solving that meal problem would've built a relationship that would've transcended politics. And, and frankly we need more of that.

With that, I'd like to open it up to the group to make some comments about the need for governmental reforms that aren't a pejorative statements about one political party or another. This is an American problem now. Much of what has happened, now has been demonstrated in Mogadishi, in Bosnia, in Panama, in Operation Provide Comfort. We saw, all out of proportion to its size, this in Grenada. What do we need to do to reform the national security process to avoid the problems that we have today in the future? And I would start with the General.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well when we looked at Haiti in 1994 and I was the J-5 then, we recognized that we needed to be able to write an op plan for the US government and there was no capacity to do so. So, um, we convened a group and we wrote the op plan and it said things like ... in a conventional operations plan, you give your task to your subordinate units – this one was written to come from the President of the United States, saying ‘Department of Justice provide civil police training and provide the rebuilding of the legal system, Department of Commerce encourage job creation in Haiti, Department of Heath and Human Services look at public health, improve public health and aid.' The problem of course is there's no mechanism to do that – there's no appropriations for it, which is <crosstalk>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): If I could reclaim the time for a moment and make my point that I keep a Powerpoint presentation which actually was Harvard Graphics back in those days, that one of the officers put together that actually got it only 50 yards down the field, to use a football field analogy, and there was no other agency support to do this even though the military force was there. And I think that's the ... you know, one of the missing pieces, if you could continue.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Having said that, once you develop these tools, you have to use them wisely. The problem we have in the United States is we've been leading with our military. The military should be the last instrument used. It became the go-to instrument in the 1990s because it had communications and logistics and because it could provide for its own security. But it's far better to have a civilian intervention capacity to be able to do real strategic planning on preventive diplomacy on <crosstalk>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): And I agree. I agree wholeheartedly with what you said. You admit, though, and I think it's very important for the record to depoliticize what I think is going to define our policy as a nation for the next 25 years. Would you admit for the record that in the 1990s, the problems that you faced as the Commander in Chief are very similar to the ones that Admiral Fallon and Dave Petraeus are facing right now where our ... let's say the more expeditionary or deployable aspects of what I think are our greatest strengths as a country – our values, our outreach, our ability to provide continuity to people's lives? Weren't there for your soldiers and so your troops had to improvise and do uh, things that were frankly outside of their operational purview and maybe more fitting with the small wars doctrine that we experienced at other times in our history?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, I'm not sure why you're asking me to make this comparison and make this admission but <crosstalk>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): The reason that I have is because you've been very very prominent nationally in using your prior military experience and our common ground and common heritage to excoriate, and I think in many cases rightly so – I've been a critic of administration policies myself that have led us to where we are, however I think it's important that we transcend that uh, as Americans versus Democrats and Republicans and ask the bigger question if the same problem was there in the 90s that's there now, it's simply much bigger because we see it in the state of this environment. What we need to do is offer a solution rather than generalities and say ‘what are some of the reforms practically in personnel policy, what are the things we could do that would allow us to go with, to the Dr.'s point the soft spectrum coming across that military force is the absolute last, but we've got a strong military deterent were it needed.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I agree with where you're driving but I want to explain something. I didn't come to this dialogue as a member of the Democratic party, I became a Democrat because of this administration and its preference for using military force. And the difference is that in the Clinton administration, military force was a last resort. In this administration, and my friend Max Boot illustrates some of the attitudes that I've heard from others in the administration – there is a reluctance to talk to people that we disagree with. Look, before we went into Haiti, we actually sent Sam Nunn and Colin Powell down there to negotiate and we didn't have to do the airborne drop in Haiti. We were able to talk Cédras out of it rather than invading. We did not do the bombing at the outset and we tried everything to stop <crosstalk>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): Let's stop there.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I want to make sure <crosstalk>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): I'm defending my time, General.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I just want to make sure there's a clear distinction. I'm agreeing with you on the need for the tools but I'm explaining the difference and I think the difference is fundamental because it's too late, even if you reform the United States government, to use those same tools to get us out of where we are in Iraq. It's too late!

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): What we're talking about again, the political posturing aside, I think that one of the points I would come back to is you had the same fundamental national security process and system and you can't say ‘well, we were diplomats then versus now' because ... and you have agreed that that process was broken and the same issues were in fact in place at that time. It doesn't hide leadership errors, but I think it's important that the American people understand that this is not simply a personality-driven crisis that we're in. We have a deeper crisis in the process of how we proceed with national security that needs to be addressed that transcends all of this. And with that, I yield back Mr. Chairman. GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Mr. Chairman, could I just ... you know, since ... I just can't let the point go because I want to make it clear. There is a difference between the administrations. In the Democratic administration, there was every effort made to learn from Haiti. PDD-56 was created and we intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo in a much different fashion and much greater awareness of our limitations than we did in Haiti. Now, when I went to the Joint Staff in 2002 and talked to the J-5 before the operation in Bosnia ... excuse me, in Iraq, I said ‘what about PDD-56 and what about the planning process and what we learned from the Balkans?' because he'd been there. And he pointed to the third floor of the Pentagon and he said to me ‘can't do it. It's them. They don't want it.' We know now from all the work that's been done how this Pentagon, under Secretary Rumsfeld, reporting to President Bush, refused to do the post-war strategy planning that was doctrinally required and that we did prior to the Kosovo campaign. So, I agree with you on the need for governmental reform of the tools but I want to make clear there was a distinction in the administrations.

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): Mr. Chairman, can I indulge you for 30 seconds?

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): You certainly can, Mr. Davis. I like a good barfight, I've already expressed that so go ahead. <laughter>

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): The other thing I'm asking you to make clear uh, because it's obvious, I think the record if fraught with uh, ineptitude in various areas, but the one thing I would come back to is the process allowed that. It wasn't a matter of personalities. And I would tend to disagree from the operational perspective that the administration was as gentle-handed in its use of the military uh, that the bigger issue and I think really for the record, what we need to leave this with is we have a much bigger issue that transcends personality, it transcends political party, that can somewhat minimize mistakes in this process uh, to your point earlier, that will allow us to use our full spectrum of our instruments of power to get to a proper end for true national strategy, which personally I don't believe we've had as a country since the end of the Cold War and I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Davis, to make the point that ... or make a very mundane or minor point that agrees with part of what you're saying you might have seen on page three of the interim report that came out yesterday. This one sentence: ‘expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel deployed to date. A full complement of surge personnel will be complete by December '07.' This is something Geoff and I have talked a lot about – the frustration of ... this is not a Rumsfeld problem, it's not a Gates problem, it is a problem that somehow in our system that the State Department or USAID or whoever it is can't get civilians on the ground and here we are at the interim report time and they don't even have half the personnel yet and we're giving the Iraqis a bad time because they're hitting less than 50% on their satisfactory/unsatisfactory, but we only have half the civilian personnel in the PRT which is an issue not totally <crosstalk>

[1:24:54]

Rep. Geoff Davis (R-KY): And I think it gets back to the issue we discussed, that State Department authorizations <inaudible> lack of appropriations for cost and the same officer who did the Harvard Graphics presentation also made the point quite clearly the night before the President's speech that the State Department would not comply with those personnel capabilities because they didn't have them, that it would be ultimately the military which I think really speaks to the root cause. Thank you for your indulgence and uh,

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): <inaudible> Dr. Gingrey's indulgence. Dr. Gingrey for five minutes.

Rep. Gingrey: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. That was very interesting and first of all, let me thank uh, our witnesses: Dr. Khan, Mr. Boot, General Clark. Sorry I missed a lot of this. We had a little activity going on on the floor uh, which is very important. Uh, General Clark, you said uh, you didn't want to let that last point go. I need to also say that I want to not let a point go. You said uh, under President Clinton that the reason that you became a Democrat was that he used military as a last resort and not a first resort. Uh, I would say that that was probably the appropriate posture being that he had weakened the military to such a drastic extent as well as our national intelligence capability. But that being said, let me start by saying that I appreciate uh, that you have put forth specific details in your redeployment plan. It's not a vague troop reduction amounting to a limited presence within 120 days with no plans or details for how to make this occur like something else going on on the floor today. You actually discuss specific troop numbers and areas in which to focus and I do commend you for that. And I largely agree with your comments that our approach must be, must be linked to a deeper, more effective political effort and the political progress on the part of the Iraqi government, it certainly has been disappointing. Uh, I want to take issue though, with some of your comments. You, you say the issue isn't troop strength in Iraq but rather United States national security in the region. I don't know how these two can be divorced and I want you to talk about that and if we have this precipitous draw down in Iraq, won't it affect our national security in the region. Dr. Khan said, and I heard his testimony this morning just before I left, that we have a hundred and something thousand mercenaries uh, fighting on behalf of the Iraqi government. I don't know who they are. I didn't know that. I've heard a lot of intelligence but I certainly didn't know about that. He says they have to be replaced and ... are the Iranians or Syrians realistically going to come in there and do that on the behalf of this Iraqi government that we've paid such a tremendous price and sacrifice in blood, sweat, toil and dollars uh, to stand up. So, this is what I want you to talk to us about. Wouldn't our national strategy be significantly hampered if the Iranians and the Syrians filled the void left by our departure and dictated the future course of Iraq?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Um, I think that we've got to have a strategy in the region that maintains an effective US role, even as we're pulling troops back from Iraq. The way to do it is to change the strategy before you change the force structure and force deployments and activities on the ground. What I'd like to see is I'd like to see a full-court diplomatic press – the same way we did it to stop the war in Bosnia. We sent a team over there. We had a kit bag of tools, we said ‘we're prepared to put so many troops in, if we get an agreement, we're prepared to do such and such, there's so much aid you could get; we're prepared ... ' There were seven things we were prepared to do. We also said um, that um, ‘we want you to tell us what you want.' What we need is a list of principles that guide US policy that we could say ‘these principles apply throughout the region.' Let's say: Respect for borders, respect for national sovereignty – we say ‘here's our principles, do you agree with these principles? Can we get a statement on it? Can we move forward from there?' And gradually work to enlarge a dialogue in the region. If we do that, we'll take the venom out of the insurgency and out of the resistance in Iraq and we'll be able to slide those troops out of there in good order and we'll be able to maintain US influence. If we don't change the strategy, if we continue to say ‘we're not talking to Iran because we don't have enough leverage over them and they're evil and we're not going to talk to Syria because we don't like him and there's inhuman conditions over ... and we don't like Hezbollah and Hamas because Iran ... ' If we say that, and we try to isolate these states, what's going to happen is they feed the resistance, we have more US losses, more instability in Iraq. And um, we undercut our own strategy and we undercut our men and women in uniform.

Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA): General, I want to say that ... the key in your remark in response is the modifier “in good order” in regard to bringing the troops out. What ... elaborate on that. What would you call ‘in good order,' - 120 days?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: What I'd call is a change in the strategy first. I'm not advocating a precipitous withdrawal like line the troops up on the road and march them out right now. I'm not saying we should do that and <crosstalk.

Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA): General, there's only <inaudible>

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I don't think the situation in Iraq is so far gone that we have to just throw up our hands and say ‘okay, we quit.' I don't think we're there. I think a year from now, if we haven't changed the strategy, we could be at the point where the American people would believe that. But, you know, there's 25 million people and they're struggling to survive in Iraq and there's going to be an Iraq where US troops are there or not. So the question is how do we relate? And what we need to do is change the strategy now so that we empower the troops that are there to work more effectively against whatever elements <inaudible> that are there still resisting. We've got to enunciate the kinds of strategic principles that other people in the region can sign up to. If we say we will only talk to democratic governments, then they're not going to ... there's no point in continuing to fight in the region because you're going to invite the resistance of those non-democratic governments. We don't have the power to effect immediate regime change in Iran, Syria and every other country in the region. And why do we want to? Those are their countries, they're their ideas. If our ideas are better, let them percolate in. This should not be an ideological campaign. What we're trying to do is fulfill our obligation to the people of Iraq by ending the violence and get our troops out of Iraq safely. That's all. <crosstalk>

Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA): My time has expired and I want to thank you for your forthright testimony, I appreciate that.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Can I make a quick 30 second comment?

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Thirty-second comment, Dr. Khan. Go ahead.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: The hundred thousand people that I was talking about Rep., they're not mercenaries hired by the Iraqi government. The US presence includes about a hundred thousand civilians who are not employed in the US government – people who work for Blackwater, people who work for Halliburton, people who work for various contractors. Some are, some are not. So, if the US were to withdraw, the US logistical support is 160,000 troops plus 100,000 additional people, some people figure 120,000. So we're looking at more than maybe 250,000 people to replace this if the US were to withdraw all of its troops. There won't be 150,000 people coming back, there'll be over 250,000 people coming back to the US from Iraq. That's the point I was trying to make.

Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA): Mr. Chairman, if we come back for a second round, maybe I'll have an opportunity to pursue this with Dr. Khan. [1:33:14]

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): And I might say too, members may have questions for the record if ... we may be interrupted with votes at some point. Mr. Bartlett for five minutes.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Thank you very much. Do each of you have something to write with and a piece of paper? Could you write four things down for me? First of all, hate each other, hate al Qaeda, hate us and something else. As a fourth line, something else. Just write that down. Something else.

Voice: Hate Bush?

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Again, hate each other, hate al Qaeda, hate us and something else. Now, if you will write down a percentage by each of those that you think accounts for the total violence that we see in Iraq. How much of that violence comes from hating each other, how much of that violence comes from hating al Qaeda, how much of that violence comes from hating us, how much of that violence comes from something else? Could you write down those four numbers for me? Each other, al Qaeda, us and something else. Have you finished? Now General Clark, if you would give your paper to Mr. uh, Boot

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I'm not finished.

<laughter>

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Roscoe, would you like me to be humming the theme song from a game show?

<laughter>

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): This will really be enlightening for me because this is a question I've wanted answered for a long time and we have some really good experts here for which I'm really appreciative. Do you all have your numbers written down? Okay, Mr. Boot if you'll hand your paper to Dr. Khan and Dr. Khan will hand his paper to General Clark. Okay, General Clark, what are the numbers that Dr. Khan had for hate each other?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Fifteen percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Fifteen percent. Uh, what is his percentage for hate al Qaeda?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Five percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Five percent. What is his number for hate us?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Sixty percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Sixty?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Sixty.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Sixty percent. And something else?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Twenty percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): What is the something else?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: They feel that cede hands of transition of power from Sunni dominated Iraq to Shia-dominated Iraq.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Okay.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: It's not because of hating each other, it's a strategic thing.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Mr. Boot, you have General Clark's paper?

Max Boot: Right, it says hate ...

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Uh, what did he uh, write down for uh, for hate each other?

Max Boot: Twenty percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Twenty percent. Hate al Qaeda?

Max Boot: Ten percent.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Ten? Alright. Hate us?

Max Boot: Thirty.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Thirty. And a huge something else. What's the something else, General?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: They're in this for their own gain. This is an opportunity to put together a new Iraq and they want power and ... and um, they want their own values, their own interests, their own opportunities and they're fighting to get it.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Okay, and now uh, I guess the only one I don't have is Mr. Boot's numbers? Dr. Khan has those. What number does Mr. Boot have for hate each other?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: He has no numbers for anything.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Sir?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: He has no numbers for anything. He has a note.

<laughter>

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Does he have any numbers?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: No.

Voice: This was not an essay test, Mr. Boot.

Max Boot: I'm better at english than at math.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): If you were to put numbers down Mr. Boot, what would you put down? I didn't want each of you informed by the others, but

Max Boot: If I could just read the note which was – I have no idea what the answer is, I don't think anyone does, but I think the primary driver of violence in Iraq is hatred and fear of each other among Iraqi sectarian groups, not of the United States.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD): Okay, so you would put a big number by hate each other? And the others have a relatively small number by hate each other. This is very informative. Mr. Chairman, I've stayed within my five minutes. Thank you very much.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Bartlett you get an A on that test because you did stay under five minutes. Mr. Jones for five minutes.

Rep. Jones: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I ... I always have great amazement at my friend, the PhD who sit beside me and I found that very interesting, I think. Um, I am one of many in Congress who, if I look at the last five years and it's going on five years, and I listen to Dr. Khan, Mr. Boot and General Clark, I have great respect for you sir as well as the two I have not met until today, uh, it appears that ... and Dr. Khan I didn't hear your presentation, I was late getting here but in your opinion, do we have any friends in the Middle East that would like to see ... I know they would like to see a stabilized Iraq, I'd assume that, but do we have any friends in the Middle East or is the hatred so deep for America being in Iraq that it's going to take generations to be in the situation ... what I want to ask and ... this is the question ... I have felt for at least a year that if this administration had any hope for a stabilized Iraq that somebody should be chosen to be an ambassador for peace – someone that is internationally respected. And let me use because of his statement last week, Colin Powell because Colin Powell said there will be no military solution, it just is not going to happen. Does it make any sense, it would not happen overnight, but is there a potential based on your knowledge of many people in the Middle East that the right person – I don't know who that is – that if this administration really wanted to see that we could maybe have the dialogue that you have spoken about and the General, does that make any sense? Is that even a possibility that the right person could begin a long process of trying to debate ... excuse me, develop a dialogue?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: I think the first step that we should take is to not see the entire Middle East as monolithic. It is not. Very different. For example, the government which is ... which we dislike the most is the Iranian at the moment and the people of Iran are the most pro-American in the entire Middle East. The governments that we like the most, and one of them is Jordan, and the people in the Middle East who hate America the most are Jordanians. The people who also had the highest support for suicide bombings are also in Jordan. So we have to understand that there is a lot more complexity to this.

[1:41:40] People consistently, in survey after survey in the Middle East, make a distinction between America and American foreign policy. They consistently say ‘we hate American foreign policy,' oddly people do not say that ‘we hate America.' They're much more <inaudible>, for example, the biggest fear, hatred, and anger are driven at our president, people like Dick Cheney and people like Max Boot here. They are suspicious of people like me, they sometimes like me, sometimes they don't but they have a lot of hope from people like General Clark. They have lots of expectations, they think that the good side of America will balance the negative and bad side of America and that is the hope of ordinary people out there.

The jihadis are at a very different level. Their animosity, their anger, their hatred is at such a different level that even if you agreed to everything that they wanted, they will still come after us. Because it is not just about diminishing the US presence in the Middle East, it is also for punishing the US for what it did in the past according to their perceptions. So they want to drive the US out of the region, they have other goals which are very similar – regime change, etc. and they also want to punish the US for past crimes etc. and they have other theological agendas too. So what we ... I still believe that we have lots of friends in the region.

The anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is much more rational than the anti-Americanism of the Europeans. Europeans don't like us just because of who we are. So if you look at say, anti-Americanism in Pakistan and Indonesia before the earthquake and tsunami, once the US provided relief, the positive attitude towards the US in Pakistan and Indonesia jumped by twenty percent – this is a huge positive shift which clearly shows the people in the Muslim world are very rational.

If we bomb them, they hate us. If we help them, they like us. And that is a positive thing because there are lots of people ... I did see President Clinton one speech in Doha, where he tossed away the speech the Britains had written for him and started reciting from memory the verses from the Koran, I could see people in the audience there who had tears and they seemed to respond to him empathetically. And people like Colin Powell or even Jim Baker from the Republican side have a lot of legitimacy in the region. I have a feeling that President Bush's father would still have reservoirs of goodwill in the Arab world in places where his son doesn't have. So it's not ... all is not lost. This is not a place that hates us. But we must also remember that there is a cognitive dissonance in the Muslim world ... even those who love to hate us would still love to live with us and live here. So there is a lot of hope for us to build bridges very quickly.

Max Boot: Mr. Chairman, could I just make a very brief statement on behalf of myself and I would let Vice President Cheney speak on his own behalf? Um, you know I agree with Dr. Khan that the people of Iran are the most pro-American in the Middle East yet I mentioned before – why are they the most pro-American in the Middle East? Because their government hates us. Because if we adopt a policy which is being advocated by General Clark of aligning ourselves with the government of Iran, we would probably turn the people of Iran against us as we have turned the people of Egypt and Jordan and so many other dictatorships around the region ... Saudi Arabia, against us. Let me just make one other point if I could because what I see here is a groundswell of people saying ‘we want a diplomatic solution to the crisis that we face in Iraq' and as I said before, I completely agree. But let me give you two, very briefly, two examples of seeking a diplomatic solution – one of which worked and one which didn't work. One 1953, the other one in 1973. In 1953, General Eisenhower got us out of the Korean War, not by say ‘we're going to bring the troops home and try to make nice with China and the Soviet Union and others.' What he did was he said, ‘we're going to keep the troops here and we're going to escalate if necessary – we're going to do anything that it takes to win' and he even dropped hints that he would use atomic weapons. Within six months, the North Koreans came to the table and made a lasting armistice that is now lasted these many decades that has been stable. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration - President Nixon and Henry Kissinger said ‘we're going to bring the troops home no matter what and by 1972 they had brought the last American combat troops home. At that point the North Vietnamese were happy to sign the Paris Peace Accord because they knew it wasn't worth the paper it was printed on. They knew that as soon as it was signed, they would start to violate the accord and they would go on to invade and conquer and occupy South Vietnam within two years of the signing of the accord. And Henry Kissinger claimed this was a great triumph of diplomacy – he got a Nobel Peace Prize. Well let me tell you, the South Vietnamese poor people don't think it's such a great triumph of diplomacy. The millions of Cambodians killed by Khmer Rouge don't think it's such a great triumph of diplomacy. Now, the difference between the two is in the case of Korea, our diplomacy was backed by force and as Rep. Davis said ... a very important point, it's not a question of diplomacy or force, the most effective diplomacy is that used in conjunction with force, but if we start withdrawals now, that will be toothless diplomacy. That will not achieve our goals, that will only convince Iran and Syria and al Qaeda that we're a paper tiger that can be attacked with impunity and we will pay a very high price for it not only in Iraq, but around the world in the future.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Ms. Shea-Porter for five minutes.

Voice: <inaudible>

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): Thank you.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Let's let Ms. Shea-Porter in.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): Okay. Um, Mr. Boot, how many times have you been to Iraq?

Max Boot: Three.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): Three, and yet you say that you had no idea what the people were thinking. And when you're talking about a diplomatic solution, you're kind of, you know poo-pooing the idea. I'd even be happy with a diplomatic understanding to begin with. This is the problem I think, that we don't even understand who the people of the Middle East are. You, I am very certain, are aware of the fact that half of the Iraqi Parliament, more than half of the democratically-elected Iraqi Parliament signed a request asking the United States to leave, right?

Max Boot: I'm not aware that the Iraqi Parliament has passed legislation asking the United States to leave.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): You know that they signed a petition asking us to leave? And, would you think that would be good enough reason to leave?

Max Boot: Uh, actually, I don't think there's a single major faction in Iraq, other than possibly al Qaeda, that actually wants us to leave and although you look at public opinion polls they say that the vast majority of Iraqis do want us to leave, but the next question is ‘when do you want Americans to leave' and they say ‘as soon as you stabilize the situation' because if you leave now it would be a disaster. And I've talked to many Iraqis over the course of the last four years and they're all virtually unanimous in saying that and that is the position of the Maliki government and elected representative of the people of Iraq.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): They did ask us. They've asked us ...

Max Boot: They have not. The Maliki government and the Congress and parliament of Iraq have not asked us to leave.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): Okay, we will follow up in a moment. But, the idea that you don't know what they think is just so disturbing. In the past couple of days I've had the opportunity to sit in a couple of hearings and one of them involved people from the CIA <inaudible> so I can speak about it and it involved a global security assessment and what they said after they'd been prodded was we were having trouble getting the kind of intelligence that we needed because of our strained relations with people on the ground in that area and also countries, including European countries. [1:49:05] Now they phrased it that ‘countries with bad attitudes don't give us the information that we need,' but the point is that if it's not working militarily, then clearly we need to try something else and then today I was fortunate enough to hear Major General Bob Scales talk about with this particular administration when we say we have a problem, the answer is maybe we can find a better computer and we can find a larger weapons system and right from the beginning of time, good soldiers have always understood that they way that you get the information from people and the way that you win hearts and minds has to do with more the way that we speak to them and understanding of their culture and we don't understand. In World War II, we understood that chewing gum and chocolate were a way of simply for finding out what was happening. We did not win their hearts and minds. So, I am concerned because I think that what's happened is in an attempt to be ... win militarily, what we've had happen to us is we have weakened the military dramatically, in particular the Army. I'm going to ask General Clark to speak about that in a moment but I just wanted to paraphrase General Pace when he was asked if he was comfortable with the idea that with the emergence of <inaudible> around the world, was he comfortable with our ability to respond and all of us should be frightened by his answer. He paused and he said ‘no, I'm not comfortable.' If every resource was in Iraq, if every ideology is sunk into Iraq and I think we're driven by ideology here, then how will we respond in the world? And so General Clark, I was going to ask you what do we do now? Are you convinced that the Army is indeed strained to its breaking point and that we're losing men and women who would have gone career and that we ought to have a problem? Are you comfortable with our ability to respond and do you think that Iraq has weakened us around the world?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I do think Iraq has weakened us around the world [1:50:55] I think we've got wonderful people in the United States Army and wonderful leadership and I think they're overstretched and I think you can see the institution beginning to fray now. It has several different problems. One set of problems is simply fatigue and the families are fatigued and stressed. They've borne an unfair burden of this conflict. A second problem has to do with relationships in the ranks and the trust and mistrust between higher ... lower and higher authorities in uniform and I think that after the conflict, we're going to need a full after action review process – a sort of wringing out, that we never did after Vietnam, in which seniors and junior leaders exchanged views, the same way we do after tactical operations. Um, and I think that uh, you can see the fraying of the recruiting effort now as well as the problem with the equipment. We haven't gone on ... we haven't budgeted everything we need even to reset the equipment much less the people. So ... yeah, I'm quite worried about it. I don't think we've got the response capability we need. But I would also tell you that more important than the military is the distraction that the Iraq commitment is doing to our national leadership. We're not focusing on the other issues that need to be addressed – our economic competitiveness in the world, our larger issues in the Middle East, and so this is a highly destructive, very political debate and uh, I just hope we've got enough wisdom to change the strategy before we pull the plug on the troops. I was in Israel just before I retired in 2000 and I remember speaking to the Chief of Defense and Minister of Defense about they were going to pull out of southern Lebanon and um, it was a strategically brilliant move by Ehud Barak, but it wasn't covered diplomatically and legally effectively and the result was that when they pulled out to regain the legitimacy and rebalance their force, they actually created the impression that they were losers and they were exploited. And I do worry about the perception management overseas and that's why I think we've got to have a strategic change before we have an operational and tactical change.

Max Boot: Let me jump in with one fast comment because I completely agree with General Clark that our military is overstretched and some of us have been saying for years that we need a much bigger Army and the Bush administration has belatedly listened to us, but I think too late, but I don't think you're going to help the Army or Marine Corps by pulling them out precipitously in defeat out of Iraq. I think that would be the worst thing possible in terms of getting morale and their fighting fitness in the future. I think a lot of soldiers who have been hanging in there because they want to be in the fight, they don't want to desert their comrades and they want to stay and win, at that point would bail out – those who have been overstretched, who have been on multiple deployments overseas. If we pull out, you're going to lose a lot of the junior leadership and you'll lose a lot the NCO corps who have been in there as long as they had a chance of winning, but if that chance is gone, I think a lot of them will leave and the Army will face a real crisis.

Rep. Shea-Porter (D-NH): May I add that we are losing men. I'm interested ... you talk about it as if it would be a future activity. The reality is that right now, we are losing our soldiers – they are bailing out and I worry if that may have an institutional history in understanding for the future. <crosstalk> The word ‘defeat' – I think we have to get away from the word ‘defeat' here we're working for a mission and whether it was right or wrong, clearly we didn't have the right intelligence but instead we were replacing Saddam and we did so at this point you know, I think I would have to argue with the word ‘defeat.' I think if we paint it that way, then we are all going to be losers for that. If we say that we did what we hoped to do in terms of replacing Saddam and giving them a democracy but we don't leave soldiers – our soldiers - in the middle of a civil war. We could really start to have an honest dialogue about a responsible exit strategy. Thank you.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Ms. Shea-Porter, we appreciate you being here today. Here's what we're going to do when we uh, we may have another 30 minutes or so, we're going to do a second round. But to my committee members, we're going to do a strict five minutes, which means the gavel will come down when the red light goes on and I think we've a shot of getting around to everybody. That means that if you're in the middle of an answer, the next person doesn't get to talk, so we won't be as liberal this time. To go ahead and start the round, I'm going to go ahead and start off here. Mr. Aiken, by the way is on the floor – he wanted to speak on the resolution today. General, I wanted to ask one specific question to you. I'm going to quote you from when you testified September 26th of '02 you were in with Richard Perle, just a few weeks before we had the vote on the authorization and this is what you said um, a few weeks before that vote: “we should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post-conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical, reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional government body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution.” Um, I mean, you could see what was necessary and ... anyway, in dealing with your attitude then, what do you think about when you see the report come out yesterday that we were talking about earlier that says we have only been able to mobilize half of the 300 civilian PRT personnel? What does that tell you as a military guy, knowing that some of your colleagues that you were raised with and served with are fighting and <inaudible> overseas and we still don't have the civilian folks on board that we would like to have? What does that say to you? What do we need to do about that?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well the government hasn't lived up to the full set of requirements.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Our government?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Our government. This is really a matter of the President of the United States. If he wants the government to live up to it, he'll tell Dick Cheney and Dick Cheney can probably make it happen. He's made a lot of other things happen. He makes it happen quietly apparently, behind the scenes, but if I believe what I read in the newspapers, he's the most powerful guy you've ever had in the United States government. So I don't know why he couldn't produce the kind of PRT support we need, if we really need it. This government hasn't been willing to mobilize and deal with the diplomatic and non-military aspects of the mission – it's dumped it all on the men and women in uniform.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): My second question for each of you, and just a brief answer – you've already touched on this in some of your written statements and some response to questions, but these predictions of what would happen if things go badly and we have a precipitous withdrawal or things don't go well ... the ability to predict, I think you used, in your words, Mr. Boot, “a catastrophe” in Iraq. How do we ... you know, the ability to predict human behavior ... I can't say what my wife's going to tell me tonight when I call her on the phone and we make these kinds of predictions about a society is going to be doing. When you make these kinds of statements, how much reliability can we place on that? How much reliability do you place on your statement or Ambassador Crocker a few days ago I think in the New York Times interview made some very strong similar statements. How much reliability do we place on that, that those kinds of bad things will occur? Three years from now <inaudible> sunrise and say ‘well, bad things didn't happen?' Tell me how you analyze as a scholar and how that will go.

[1:58:34]

Max Boot: I think it's based on my general knowledge of the situation and weighing the probabilities and I think everyone who undertakes that and of course there's no certitude in these kinds of predictions and I hope that I'm wrong. I hope that <inaudible> withdraw and things will work out much better than I expect but the problem is that when we went into Iraq based on rosy scenarios, we went in there expecting the best and we got the worst and I don't think we can afford to leave expecting the best and be surprised by the worst, whereas if we expect the worst and plan for it, we can be very pleasantly surprised and things may work out much better than we feared.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Do you have any comments, Dr. Khan?

Dr. Muqtedar Khan: Yes. I think the United States has a long record of not finishing business. After Gulf War I, we did not finish the job then. In Afghanistan, we just up and left after the Soviet Union left. We did not finish the job of demobilizing the Afghani Arabs. We did not disarm them. We did not relocate them back to where they had come. We helped them mobilize as people to go from all over the Arab world to fight in Afghanistan. We left them and now we owe them and contemporary al Qaeda is a consequence of the fact that we did not deal with a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Now if we do the same, we're talking about the administration not having a post-victory plan in Iraq, but if we do not deal with the post-withdrawal phenomenon in Iraq, we may be facing something which is much more devastating, much more horrific than what al Qaeda brought upon us and this is a very serious matter, I think. It's just not about dealing with the public opinion, we must also demand responsibility from American citizens. There was 70% support for this war, it's not just President Bush's fault or Dick Cheney's fault or this Congress's fault. They also supported this war and now they want to run away without thinking about it. We need to think this thing through and the citizens need to buckle up on what needs to be done in Iraq in the long term as well as in the short term. It's important for the leadership both in the Congress and the White House to stand up and demand from the Americans more responsibility.

Chairman Vic Snyder (D-AR): Mr. Johnson for five minutes. A strict five minutes.

[2:00:35]

Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA): Thank you Mr. Chairman. General Clark, you've mentioned a couple of times ... several times that we need to change the strategy before we uh, redeploy and you gave some examples of changing the strategy: announcing regime change uh, engaging in dialogue with the stakeholders over there, possible uh ... or pursue a solution to the Palestinian issue between Israel and the Palestinians. Are you suggesting that we should maintain the same troop levels while we go through that, pretty much diplomatic process? Should we sus ... should we sustain our current boots on the ground numbers while we go through those diplomatic processes and get some kind of positive result before we downsize – is that what you're suggesting?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: I think in terms of what I'm recommending for legislation and what the Congress should demand of the administration, they should demand a two brigade withdrawal so that you've got a strategic reserve able to be reconstituted a little bit earlier back in the United States. Those two brigades should be out by Christmas.

Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA): Approximately how many?

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Two brigades – th