GEN. CLARK: "Well, I think you have to go back really—let’s start with 9/11; 3,000 dead in this country underscore the deadly threat of al-Qaeda. Somehow, we got that tied in with Iraq.

From the beginning, people were saying Iraq must have been behind it. Well, they weren’t behind it.

Why not have focused exclusively on al-Qaeda, and said, 'Here’s our target, set Iraq aside, strengthen containment. OK. We don’t want them dealing with terrorists. They’re a potential proliferant.'

" But then so is Iran. They actually have a more active terrorist network. They also have weapons of mass destruction, and then here’s North Korea that even has nuclear weapons, and they do sell. So you have three potential major proliferants, and then you have al-Qaeda. Why not focus on al-Qaeda and then work that very intensively, work it diplomatically? Go into the United Nations and start with indicting Osama bin Laden as a war criminal. "

"It's unlikely the inspectors will ever find the so-called smoking gun on this. But if it makes our allies more able to go to their publics and justify their support of our operation, then I think that's important,"

"We are at a turning point in America's history. We are about to embark on an operation that is going to put us in a colonial position in the Middle East following Britain."

Excerpt from AN ARMY OF ONE?
September 2002.

The Kosovo campaign suggests alternatives in waging and winning the struggle against terrorism: greater reliance on diplomacy and law and relatively less on the military alone.

Soon after September 11, without surrendering our right of self-defense, we should have helped the United Nations create an International Criminal Tribunal on International Terrorism. We could have taken advantage of the outpourings of shock, grief, and sympathy to forge a legal definition of terrorism and obtain the indictment of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban as war criminals charged with crimes against humanity.

Had we done so, I believe we would have had greater legitimacy and won stronger support in the Islamic world. We could have used the increased legitimacy to raise pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to cut off fully the moral, religious, intellectual, and financial support to terrorism.

We could have used such legitimacy to strengthen the international coalition against Saddam Hussein.

Excerpt from Testimony at
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
September 26, 2002.

The problem of Iraq is only an element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished, world-wide war against Al Qaeda, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies, and that ultimately be won by persuasion as much as by force, when we turn off the Al Qaeda recruiting machine…
The critical issue facing the Unites States now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaeda or efforts to deal with other immediate, mid and long-term security problems.

In this regard, I would offer the following considerations:

• The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will not. The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail. The more focused the resolution on Iraq and the problem of weapons of mass destruction, the greater its utility in the United Nations. The more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts underway.
  
  
• The President and his national security team must deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in crafting UN engagement. In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force. This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam’s weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. Yes, there is a risk that inspections would fail to provide the evidence of his weapons programs, but the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by opportunity to gain allies and support in the campaign against Saddam.

Force should not be used until the personnel and organizations to be involved in post-conflict Iraq are identified and readied to assume their responsibilities. This includes requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps including a new constitution. Ideally, international and multinational organizations will participate in the readying of such post-conflict operations, including the UN, NATO, and other regional and Islamic organizations.

Force should be used as the last resort; after all diplomatic means have been exhausted, unless information indicates that further delay would present an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. This action should not be categorized as “preemptive.”