We are in a crisis in our relations with the rest of the world. Today, at a time when we need friends and allies more than ever, resentment of America has never been higher, and that makes every American less safe at home and abroad.

We are weaker without allies. We are not going to be able to maintain stability in the Middle East, support reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq, deal with the challenges of North Korea, continue this struggle against terrorism, face the problem of Iran and still return to prosperity in this country - unless we are sharing burdens with allies.

We have done well in the world because of who we are: We are not a country that manipulates facts, ignores debate, and stifles dissent. We are not a country that retaliates against people who criticize the government. We are not a country that disdains our friends and allies. We are not a country that sheds blood before every other option has been exhausted.

Excerpt from Remarks,
DNC Fall Meeting,
October 3, 2003.

We believe in international institutions. President Harry Truman built the United Nations, even though after World War II, we were the only power still standing, we knew we needed friends and allies in the world to help us bear the burdens of leadership, and right the wrongs. And we believe in a strong military. We've got the best-trained, best-prepared, strongest armed forces in the world. And that's the way they'll stay. But we know one thing also. Use force only, only, only, as a last resort.

On these three principles, inclusiveness, multilateral institutions, and the use of force as a last resort, we can build a strong foreign policy. We can strengthen our ties with Europe and with nations around the world. And we can preserve peace.

GEN. CLARK: Well, I think they can show some restraint. But the problem is when you have hard intelligence that you're about to be struck, it's the responsibility of a government to take action against that intelligence and prevent the loss of lives. It's what any society would expect of its leadership. So there's a limit to how much restraint can be shown.

MR. RUSSERT: What can the president do now...

GEN. CLARK: I...

MR. RUSSERT: ...to bring about peace?

GEN. CLARK: I think what we've got to do is bring more of the neighboring countries' leadership in more strongly. You know, in the case in Europe when we were dealing with the problems in Yugoslavia, we set up the contact group. The contact group had the United States and it had the European Union; it had Russia. And Russia at the time, frankly, was very supportive of the Serbs. They represented the Serbs' views in these meetings. And what we need in the Middle East, I believe, is something stronger than the current informal bilateral relationships that work on the periphery of the struggle. I think you need a Middle East contact group, because I think peace in the region is in the interests of all the countries in the region.

We need to work pragmatically on the problems we are facing today such as the challenges of North Korea's nuclear program and the continuing bloodshed in the Middle East. We need to work on our real interests and avoid the siren song of moral crusades.

One of the key issues is this problem of nation building. You can't duck it by calling it a dirty word and saying you're not going to do it. It has to be done. The failure of states to meet the needs of their citizens can lead to conflict, both internally and externally. Thus we have to help rescue these states -- not out of altruism, not simply because it's right, but because it's in our very real interest to do so.

In closing, I would like to propose developing a strategy that addresses three main questions:

1. When do we use force? Under the threat of terrorism, with fear spreading throughout America, we went on to cast a shadow across the entire world with our doctrine of preemption. Our allies abroad still want to know the precise criteria that justify our use of force. They're very happy for Saddam Hussein to be expelled; but when it comes to threatening to use force, they want to know what confers legitimacy on U.S. actions. We have yet to answer that question to their satisfaction; but if we're going to put together a strategy that brings this country together and moves us forward in a comprehensive way, we have to do that.

2. What should we do about the UN and NATO? One of the justifications for going after Saddam Hussein was that the United Nations couldn't survive if people were allowed to violate UN Security Council resolutions with impunity. It is high time to revisit the situation with the UN and decide how to confer on it greater legitimacy. For instance, we ought to ask why Syria is in charge of disarmament, and Cuba about to become in charge of human rights. We need to establish the kind of conditions that will justify the UN's actions in the eyes of the American people so that the UN can function more effectively, as envisioned by our own leaders a half-century ago. And, as already mentioned, we should consider giving NATO a mission to help fight the war on terrorism rather than relegating it to the periphery, because we need to get our allies deeply involved in this action.

3. How do we make our way ahead in the world? Hans Morgenthau understood that we had to be very careful with the grand moral visions that tempt all nations. He understood that we had to beware of the "triumphalist" instinct. He understood that the power of states is constrained and transitory. If he were here today, I think he would say: "Be careful where that incredible military is taking you as you employ it in the war on terror. Be careful of the great visions and the moralistic hopes." Instead, we need to work pragmatically on the problems we are facing today such as the challenges of North Korea's nuclear program 3 and the continuing bloodshed in the Middle East. We need to work on our real interests and avoid the siren song of moral crusades.

And Morgenthau would tell us one more thing. He would warn us to walk softly, with humility, even though we are now the world's lone superpower. That would be good advice for this country in the days ahead.

QUESTION: Strategically, what do you think is the right direction for American foreign policy?

WESLEY CLARK: The first thing you should do is have a dialogue with the American public to try to bring them back on board. We have lost the American people out somewhere in the hinterlands, in places like Kansas and Arkansas and Mississippi. To them, there is something nasty about the term "mission creep." We've got to bring them through this learning process and make them aware that they are living in a changed world. If we don't get the information out to the public first, we'll never be able to set in place the policy that needs to emerge.

Then we need to work with our representatives in the House and in the Senate. We need to put together the right agencies of government to deal with the problem of failed states. That is at least 30 percent of the problem.

Next we need to take the terrorist issue and make sure we are responding to it not only with military strikes, law enforcement measures, and reprisals but also with an understanding of Islam. Once we know what's motivating the terrorists, and can perceive the sources of the terrorist education, we should be able to take preventive measures to stem the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to the madrassas [Islamic religious schools]; change the curriculum in the madrassas; and work against the folks in Pakistan who are opposing General Musharraf and feeding the terrorist threat in Kashmir and elsewhere. So we need a broader set of policies to deal with terrorism.

Third, and as I mentioned in my presentation, we need to step back again and look at our international institutions and where we want the world to be in thirty and fifty years. What we have to do is continue to formulate a code of behavior for states.

Yes, weapons of mass destruction do change the nature of the threat because it is no longer just a state but a band of individuals that can wreak enormous damage on another country. That means you've got to have closer cooperation between and among states.

But such cooperation cannot be imposed from without. No matter how powerful our military, we don't have unlimited power, and especially not unlimited staying power. It has to be arrived at on the basis of consensus; and the place to begin that consensus is by working with other like-minded democracies. We urgently need to sit down and talk to them.

President Bush has put an extremely big chip on the table: it's the United States armed forces, which can go anywhere, any time, and attack anyone who is a challenger or a potential challenger to the United States. If I were another country, I would be quite concerned about that -- and they are. I would also be willing to listen and dialogue with the United States intensively about this -- and they are. But we need to do our part in laying out the framework for that dialogue.

How do we take the United Nations and NATO to the next level of dealing with threats in the international environment? Those organizations were set up to resolve disputes among nations, but this is no longer enough to provide security. You've got to go deeper into the fabric of each nation, making sure they are fulfilling their responsibilities to the rest of the world by controlling the behavior of errant citizens and limiting the damage they might do abroad. Countries should all be working together on that goal and on sharing information cooperatively. If we do that, maybe we can reduce our reliance on the military in this process.

So these are three elements of strategy. And that strategy must then be linked with the economic piece, the environmental piece, and all the other elements that govern our intercourse with other nations; and then it's got to be understood by the American people. We are not there yet. A lot of labor still needs to go into creating a comprehensive plan.

I believe our security as a nation, and the safety of every American, is best enhanced by a broad and visionary leadership, which enlists capable and committed allies in support. We are safer when we are liked, not when we are hated, when we are respected, not just feared. American power should remain a wellspring of inspiration, not become a source of concern. As President Harry S. Truman stated at the founding of the United Nations in 1945 (without new security structures)...'we will be forced to accept the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that Might Makes Right. To deny this premise, and we most certainly do, we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute it. Words are not enough. We must, once and for all, reverse the order, and prove by our acts conclusively, that Right Has Might.'
…
We should be focusing our security efforts first on how to prevent war. Deterrence and containment are still largely valid concepts, even in the post-Cold War world. This means focusing on ending both conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation, encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes, and improving opportunities for all nations around the world to achieve some of the security, democracy and prosperity that Americans enjoy. We should be seeking to prevent the emergence of frictions and tensions that might lead to conflict. When problems do arise, we should use diplomacy and economic measures first, and force only as a last resort. If fighting is necessary, we should aim to work multilaterally with strong allies if we can, and unilaterally only if we must. And in each of these tasks, we should expect the greatest potential for support from our friends and allies in Europe.
…
When the nation is in imminent danger, every American President has always had the authority and responsibility to consider the use of force preemptively, and many have done so. But this has not changed the broader pattern of international affairs with which we must be concerned - American interests in promoting trade, travel and commerce abroad: encouraging the free flow of capital and ideas; and sustaining international institutions to ease the burdens of leadership in working difficult issues like trade and development, economic growth, the environment and security.
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I would hope that you would call for greater commitment from American leadership in the further transformation of NATO, that our nation may energize a new era of collective efforts to strengthen our security abroad, reduce our burdens at home, prepare the institutions and procedures we will need to guard American interests decades into the future, and make every American safer and more welcome at work or at leisure anywhere in the world.

In the twilight of World War II we recognized the need for allies. We understood the need to prevent conflict, not just fight it, and we affirmed the idea that we must banish from the world what President Harry Truman, addressing the founding of the United Nations, called "the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that 'might makes right.'" Truman went on to say that we must "prove by our acts that right makes might." Since September 11, America has been in a similar position: the most powerful nation in the world, but facing a deadly enemy. The United States has the opportunity to use the power of the international institutions it established to triumph over terrorists who threaten not just the United States, but also the world. What a tragedy it will be if we walk away from our own efforts, and from 60 years of post-World War II experience, to tackle the problem of terror without using fully the instruments of international law and persuasion that we ourselves created.

But in the end, the strategic adaptation was all the more powerful because it represented a unified Alliance, not a single nation. In that sense, the political power of NATO's member nations enabled us to reinforce the military actions and achieve a military success at remarkably little cost in Allied lives and resources. We paid a price in operational effectiveness by having to constrain the nature of the operation to fit within the political and legal concerns of NATO member nations, but the price brought significant strategic benefits that future political and military leaders must recognize.
p. 426

The challenge for NATO's member nations is to harmonize differing national interests and points of view, in order to use the expertise and influence of the Alliance early in a crisis, when NATO can be effective in deterring or preventing conflict, not later, when the only question is whether to fight.
p. 446

…If NATO is to retain its central role in transatlantic security, the both Europe and the United States must use it as their primary consultative and decisionmaking forum. NATO must have full transparency into all EU security discussions and an implicit right of first refusal on meeting any European security challenges. The United States must make it clear that it will participate and will not refuse in future contingencies.
p. 448

Nations use diplomacy as a means to advance their interests. But when the interests are significant enough, when dialogue, negotiation, and compromise can't gain traction, and when nations believe their military advantage is sufficient, they will again employ threat to provide additional leverage.

Once the threat surfaces, however, nations or alliances are committed. Following through to preserve credibility becomes a matter of vital interest. Credibility is the ultimate measure of value for states and international institutions. Inevitably, sacrificing credibility carries long-term consequences far greater than the immediate issue, whatever it is. And both sides in the dispute are affected—those who have received the threat as well as those who have issued it.

This suggests that if coercive diplomacy is to succeed at the lowest possible cost, greater emphasis must be placed on the diplomacy at the outset. Ministers and heads of government should be personally engaged when the threat behind the diplomacy is still veiled and vague, before the first aircraft or ships have been positioned. But while non-military coercive measures should be used first, military advice is needed early, too. Once the commitments have been made, the military must focus on making the decisions succeed.
pp. 456-457

What I learned during my time in Europe was that the strongest force in the world is an idea whose time has come. In Europe, and in much of the rest of the world, freedom, human rights, international law, and the opportunity to be all you can be are those ideas whose formulation and dissemination owe much to American example and leadership in the past.

Because we live and extol these values, the United States enjoys a solid ethical basis for its power, a supportive community of likeminded nations and international institutions, and a moral force that extends our influence. Preserving these ideas and projecting our values should therefore be ranked among the most important of American interests

To do so will require humility, generosity, and courage. We must still recognize and respect the strong convictions of others, especially when they disagree with us. No doubt our ideas will appear challenging or even dangerous to some. We have to balance our pride in our heritage with humility in our rhetoric. Living up to our values will cost resources that could always be used elsewhere. We can't do everything. But doing what we can will likely mean that we occasionally send our men and women abroad, into ambiguous, dangerous situations.

But these are the burdens we must carry, if we expect to maintain the benefits we currently enjoy. They provide hope for others, and a purpose beyond our own prosperity. Shared risks, shared burdens, shared benefits –it's not only a good motto for NATO, it's also a good prescription for America's role in the world.
pp. 460-461